

A Possession for All Time:
Thucydides' Lasting Influence upon Military Thought and Theory

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Even the most creative theories in history were not conceived in a vacuum; one way or another, they owe something to the works of others.¹

—Michael I. Handel

Great thinkers leave their marks but some fade with time. Philosophical and social theories may be vogue one day and gone the next. All of academia is susceptible to this intellectual instability, including those who study military thought and theory, less the anomaly of Thucydides. Why does the solitary work of one ancient historian from Athens still hold so much influence over modern military studies? For the past two millennia, generations of military historians and theorists derived a series of significant principles and impressions from the writings of Thucydides, a battle-hardened academic who examined the true nature of war, strategy, and the greater human condition.

This paper categorically examines the Thucydidean legacy in three major areas. Material found within the pages of *The Peloponnesian War* influenced the development of modern academic historiography, the study of human behavior within the context of martial thought, and current military theory. Modern day scholars, such as W. P. Wallace, Victor Davis Hanson, Hans Delbrück, and Gordon A. Craig, commended or indirectly credited Thucydides' contributions to Western history.² In addition, Sir William Howard's labor on the great "liberal dilemma" circuitously praised Thucydides' prescient commentaries on the human condition.³

¹ Michael I. Handel, "Corbett, Clausewitz, and Sun Tzu," *Naval War College Review* (Autumn, 2000), 107, accessed 29 July 2016, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/8f256f9e-8ff7-4354-b814-15221114ad1f/Corbett.-Clausewitz.-and-Sun-Tzu.aspx>.

² W. P. Wallace, "Thucydides," *Phoenix* 18/4 (Winter, 1964), 251, accessed 31 July 2016. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1086359>; Victor Davis Hanson, Introduction to *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York, NY: Free Press, 1996, 2008), xxii; Gordon A. Craig, "Delbrück: The Military Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 332-33.

³ Michael Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience: The George Macaulay Trevelyan Lectures in the University of Cambridge, 1977* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978, 1986, 2004), 3.

Lastly, I maintain that Thucydides' offerings to military theory and his descriptive model of war influenced the opinions of the eminent strategist Carl von Clausewitz. Thucydides accurately predicted debate over the nonlinearity of war, the motivations of state actors, national security concerns, and ethics in military leadership—with many of these latter elements remaining applicable today. As recently mentioned in a Naval War College article, students truly stand to gain more from simply reading the whole of *The Peloponnesian War* than analyzing and interpreting an entire collection of literature on the subject.⁴

Thucydides' first major contribution to modern military studies was his ground-breaking approach to academic historiography. Some controversy surrounds the validity of *The Peloponnesian War* and his true motivation behind writing it. Nevertheless, the consensus view of his account, as expressed by historians Wallace and Hanson, is one of optimistic praise. In a 1964 scholarly article for the classics journal, *Phoenix*, Wallace applauded Thucydides' disinterested and objective elegance, a style that outwardly appears tranquil and accurate to both the professional and layperson alike.⁵ Three decades later, Hanson, in an introduction to Professor Robert B. Strassler's annotated version of *The Peloponnesian War*, maintained that Thucydides' aptitude in writing history far outshined any of his perceived faults or limitations.⁶ Concerning his desire to recount the details of the long and bitter conflict, Thucydides himself informed us that, "In fine, I have written my work, not as an essay which is to win the applause of the moment, but a possession for all time."⁷ Wallace and Hanson, along with a host of other

⁴ "The Peloponnesian War: Democracy, Leadership and Strategy in a Long War," [Joint Professional Military Education, Phase II Senior Level Course: College of Naval Warfare and Naval Command College] *Strategy and Policy* (February 2016 – June 2016), 50, accessed 13 June 2016, <https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/1b84d389-88f5-40d3-831f-9ec42f4bf0b8/ILC-Syllabus---AY2014-2015.aspx>.

⁵ Wallace, "Thucydides," 251.

⁶ Hanson, Introduction to *Landmark Thucydides*, xxii.

⁷ Thucydides, *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York, NY: Free Press, 1996, 2008), 16.

scholars, might take issue with Thucydides' glaring lack of modesty, yet corroborate his claim.⁸ We can thus conclude, with a relative amount of rational certainty, that Thucydides' monograph is a factual and true account of the Peloponnesian War, written for the sake of chronicling the past and enlightening future generations. From a historiographic perspective, there is no purer pursuit of the craft; objectively researching and writing history on its own terms is at the academic heart of the discipline.

It is appropriate, while maintaining this perspective, to note that Thucydides historiographically eclipsed his immediate predecessor, Herodotus. The latter, while widely considered one of the founding fathers of Western history, was unsuccessful in matching the unbiased accuracy and detachment of Thucydides. Herodotus veraciously chronicled the Persian War but failed to investigate or stringently assess his sources, unlike his younger counterpart. Thucydides, however, harbored several of his own imperfections, prompting some detractors to occasionally refer to him as sporadic, conflicting, or otherwise inconsistent.⁹ Hanson countered these critics by contextually dismissing or justifying such errors as excusable faults in an otherwise accurate and exhaustive body of work.¹⁰ He mentioned Thucydides' failure in addressing the unprecedented destruction wrought upon the countryside and rural inhabitants of wartime Greece, but defended this omission in noting that Thucydides' aim was to write a martial history rather than an ethnic or agricultural account of events.¹¹ Acutely aware of his own faults, Thucydides actively took steps to avoid the blunders of Herodotus by deliberately

⁸ Wallace, "Thucydides," 251; Hanson, Introduction to *Landmark Thucydides*, xi.

⁹ Hanson, Introduction to *Landmark Thucydides*, xx.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*, xxi.

advocating an “absence of romance” in his work, something that his predecessor and contemporaries relied on in creating their epic and tragic histories.¹²

When contrasting their varying styles, it is not unusual for modern scholars to indirectly validate Thucydides by criticizing Herodotus, rather than overtly praising the academic merits of the younger scholar. The nineteenth-century German military historian, Hans Delbrück, was at once a champion of empirical historiography and a staunch critic of Herodotus.¹³ Delbrück studied Herodotus intently while developing his scientific method of historical inquiry referred to as *sachkritik*.¹⁴ His unique theory involved examining past accounts of battles and retroactively comparing the details of those conflicts against modern facts and figures associated with logistical and tactical matters of combat.¹⁵ Delbrück held a critical view of the contemporary military establishment and aimed to validate the history upon which members of the German High Command based their policies and tactics.¹⁶ According to Craig, Delbrück routinely undermined or disproved the accounts of Herodotus, who frequently exaggerated the size and capabilities of ancient Greek armies fighting in the Persian War, while pursuing this goal.¹⁷ Thucydides, however, was never the target of such condemnation. Delbrück was not simply playing favorites. To the contrary, the German historian took issue with Herodotus for similar reasons as Thucydides. It was Herodotus’ tendency to dramatize battles that detracted from his credibility as a historian, unlike Thucydides who endeavored to remove superfluous subjectivity from his history.¹⁸

¹² Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 16; Wallace, “Thucydides,” 258-9.

¹³ Craig, “Delbrück,” 332-33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 334-5.

¹⁷ Craig, “Delbrück,” 334-6.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 16.

Thucydides' second major contribution to modern military studies was his revolutionary input on human behavior and martial thought. Commensurate with his incredible impact upon history and historiography are Thucydides' reflections on men at war. Returning once again to the insights of Hanson, we gain another glimpse into the enduring and transcendent legacy of Thucydides. Hanson commended Thucydides' keen skill in using information to develop astonishing visions of public conduct during extreme periods of communal violence and social unrest.¹⁹ Thucydides recounted some of the most chaotic and challenging aspects of the protracted conflagration between Athens and Sparta in the second, third, and fifth books of *The Peloponnesian War*. He exposed the darker side of humanity when describing the plagued citizens of Athens abandoning any remnants of hope, integrity, or justice.²⁰ Thucydides observed that civic and social revolt was an unavoidable and disparaging act of man, while detailing the destructive effects of upheaval and political strife.²¹ He offered a commentary on the harsh realities of war in the Melian Dialogue, where a cynical Athenian diplomat warns his military and economic lessors to avoid placing stock in false gods or prophets in the face of their looming and unavoidable subjugation.²²

Disease, rebellion, and conflict were not exclusive to Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. The intellectual revelations associated with the scholarly examination of these enigmatic concepts, however, gradually faded into relative obscurity until resurrection during a more sophisticated era of academic illumination in Europe. In his *War and the Liberal Conscience*, Howard identified and detailed an expansive progression of liberal and academic developments

¹⁹ Hanson, Introduction to *Landmark Thucydides*, xxii.

²⁰ Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 121.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 199.

²² *Ibid.*, 353-4.

ranging from the Western European Enlightenment to the late twentieth-century.²³ He examined the evolution of a “liberal conscience,” typified by Erasmus’ condemnation of war, Machiavelli’s view of war as an apparatus of the state, Thomas More’s version of utopian conflict, and Eméric Crucé’s groundbreaking views on international struggles.²⁴ While Howard did not directly acknowledge Thucydides, it is apparent that his examination of Renaissance scholarship owes an indirect nod to the enlightened men of antiquity. The free-thinkers of early modern Europe were well-known for condemning the brutality and senselessness of war, but it was Thucydides who, like Erasmus, grieved over calamities of a volume and scope that were beyond comparison or comprehension.²⁵ Like Machiavelli and More, Thucydides identified—through a series of dialogues and narratives, such as with the Athenian statesman Pericles—the unique and often troubling relationship between politics and war.²⁶ Thucydides, like Crucé, also highlighted the complications with the compulsion of fighting wars abroad.²⁷

Moving his study forward a few centuries, Howard remarked that Carl von Clausewitz was the first intellectual to seriously consider the caustic implications of radical government upheavals, in that most insurgencies ironically instigated wars rather than diminished conflict.²⁸ While it is true that the Prussian military officer, historian, and strategist lamented the violence associated with political disorders in nineteenth-century Europe, he was hardly the first scholar to draw such conclusions. Thucydides, some two-thousand years before Clausewitz, scripted numerous dialogues about the various problems associated with the imperfect model of Athenian

²³ Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, 3-5.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 13-20.

²⁵ Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 16.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 127-8.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 469.

²⁸ Howard, *War and the Liberal Conscience*, 131.

democracy, which fervently employed war to obtain its political ends.²⁹ Furthermore, Professor Robert Schlatter wrote, in article for the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, that Thomas Hobbes, in translating Thucydides, was simply following in the footsteps of Renaissance scholars, who frequently consulted Greco-Roman literature in the hope of gaining some insight into the machinations of modern government.³⁰ If Hobbes, who preceded Clausewitz by two centuries, sought enlightenment in the works of Thucydides, it is reasonable to conclude that Clausewitz and his contemporaries did the same. Little intellectual fortitude is needed to surmise that these men were influenced by the collective academic weight of successive generations of thought centered around Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War. Clearly, the true foundation of Howard's "liberal conscience" lies not in the sixteenth- or nineteenth-centuries, but rather in antiquity with Thucydides.

Having interjected Clausewitz into the argument, let us now move onto Thucydides' third major contribution to modern military studies, his insights on military theory. Thucydides and Clausewitz each shared several experiences and opinions that brought legitimacy, attention, and depth to their works. In comparing the two, we eliminate many boundaries that isolate or categorically insulate the otherwise superior qualities of Thucydidean thought. In other words, certain attributes and ideas transcend time and perpetuate greatness. Each man, for instance, actively served his country and personally witnessed the savagery of war. Writing of a bloody battle and the dangers at Delium, Thucydides remarked that the Athenian army was placed in a state of utter panic and fled the field, having lost sight of their commander and subsequent hope

²⁹ Alan L. Boegehold, "Appendix A: The Athenian Government in Thucydides," in *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War* by Thucydides, 577-582, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York, NY: Free Press, 1996, 2008), 579.

³⁰ Richard Schlatter, "Hobbes and Thucydides," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 6/3 (June, 1945), 350, accessed 31 July 2016, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2707297>.

of victory.³¹ Clausewitz, also familiar with the erosive effects of fear, warned that peril was enticing to the novice but an impedance to veterans in combat.³² Their common baptisms in fire drove both men to speculate upon the nature of war, but not beyond the pragmatic reach of their own personal experiences. Thucydides “possession for all time” declaration is remarkably similar to comments made by Clausewitz, when contemplating an early version of his work, *On War*.³³ “It was my ambition to write a book that would not be forgotten after two or three years,” Clausewitz wrote, “and that possibly might be picked up more than once by those who are interested in the subject.”³⁴

Students of military theory frequently find Thucydides and Clausewitz share the dubious distinction of being somewhat difficult to comprehend. Many of their groundbreaking concepts are large, intellectually cumbersome, and difficult to articulate in simple terms. Wallace once said that Thucydides’ lucidity and composition were both cerebrally daunting and indicative of underlying emotive desires, a bubbling caldron of repressed passions concealed behind a veneire of composed commentaries.³⁵ Military strategist Bernard Brodie, in his “Guide to Reading of *On War*,” observed that grasping Clausewitz is difficult because his talking points are frequently smothered beneath layers of elaborate concepts, conjecture, and speculative theory.³⁶ Despite their verbose faults, each scholar still managed to paint a compelling picture of the true nature and significance of war. Thucydides wrote of his decision to chronicle the Peloponnesian War that it was a monumental moment in time, not just of Greece but the entire known world, of all

³¹ Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 275.

³² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 2nd edition, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 113-4.

³³ Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 16.

³⁴ Clausewitz, *On War*, 63.

³⁵ Wallace, “Thucydides,” 251.

³⁶ Bernard Brodie, “A Guide to the Reading of *On War*,” in *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz, 2nd ed., eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 641.

humanity.³⁷ Clausewitz likewise reflected that war was not an act upon itself and that conflict was derivative of human behavior.³⁸ This all culminated in each man developing an elaborate and durable trinity to better explain the interdependent relationship between human behavior, military thought, and the theory of war. Thucydides wrote, in justifying their actions before an audience of skeptical Spartans, that an Athenian delegation proclaimed:

Surely, Spartans, neither by the patriotism... nor by wisdom... do we merit our extreme unpopularity with the Hellenes, not at least unpopularity for our empire... And the nature of the case first compelled us to advance our empire to its present height; fear being our principle motive, thought honor and interests afterward came... It follows that it was not a very remarkable action, or contrary to the common practice of mankind, if we did accept an empire that was offered to us, and refused to give it up under the pressure of *the three of the strongest motives, fear, honor, and interest* [emphasis added].³⁹

Thus, Thucydides saw man as driven by the three factors of fear, honor, and interest—with some translations equating “interest” to “economic profit.”⁴⁰ Society’s willingness to resist or succumb to this trinity of inducements resulted in political tension, internecine conflict, or outright war. In a similar vein, Clausewitz hypothesized that:

War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.⁴¹

In his estimation, emotion, chance, and political policies were requisite to war. While Clausewitz fails to match Thucydides count-for-count, it is apparent that both men saw a prevalent interaction between human feelings, the inherent need to outclass or outmatch one’s competition, public policy, and the theory of war. Thucydides saw men systematically attempting to profit from one another, while Clausewitz recognized that rival politicians pulled many of the army’s strategic strings. There is little doubt that Clausewitz was an original

³⁷ Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 3.

³⁸ Clausewitz, *On War*, 78.

³⁹ Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 43.

⁴⁰ Schlatter, “Tomas Hobbes and Thucydides,” 357.

⁴¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 89.

thinker. The above similarities, however, go far in illustrating the influence of an enduring and undeniable Thucydidean influence upon war theory.

Before concluding this essay, some final things must be said of Thucydides' solitary appeal among military theorists. First, his descriptive theory is rationally palatable as it relies and capitalizes upon the inherently random and unpredictable nature of warfare. Rather than telling his audience, via a series of inflexible maxims how to win a war, Thucydides simply describes events as they occurred—the reader is left to make up his or her own mind on the matter.⁴² As Wallace put it, Thucydides presented his history in a very fluid, chronological, and organic manner.⁴³ Professor Alan D. Beyerchen's observations that, war is inherently erratic and that friction arises between opponents and allies alike, are indicative of the domestic or actor-versus-actor challenges faced during Thucydides' time and even today.⁴⁴ Hanson, putting the matter perfectly, summarized that, "If Thucydides' historical material is less rich and enchanting than *The Persian Wars* of Herodotus, his carefully chosen military episodes and political speeches by themselves explicitly reveal cause and effect... and often lead to more profound and general truths about the human experience."⁴⁵

If any overall certainty may be derived from studying human behavior, it is that attempts to deter or compel people usually result in abject failure. Thucydides spoke to this fact in *The Peloponnesian War* and the matter remains a prevalent focus of study in today's global security environment.⁴⁶ In a 2007 article on the topic, political scientist Richard Ned Lebow revealed

⁴² Wallace, "Thucydides," 252.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Alan D. Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* 17/3 (Winter, 1992), 9-10, accessed 29 July 2016, <http://www.clausewitz.com/item/Beyerchen-ClausewitzNonlinearityAndTheUnpredictabilityOfWar.htm>.

⁴⁵ Hanson, Introduction to *Landmark Thucydides*, xiii.

⁴⁶ Richard Ned Lebow, "Thucydides and Deterrence," *Security Studies* 16/2 (April – June 2007), 163, accessed 31 July 2016, DOI: 10.1080/09636410701399440.

that Thucydides pioneered the argument that “deterrence and compellence,” as geopolitical policies, were problematically more often the cause of undesired outcomes than the harbingers of anticipated political objectives—an uncomfortable truth that plagues today’s modern strategic setting.⁴⁷ Lebow went on to cite ten instances of the Peloponnesian War where attempts to deter or compel one of the various Mediterranean factions backfired with disastrous results.⁴⁸ Pericles’ failed effort to dissuade the Athenian assembly from going to war is one instance of an internal conflict in which an antagonist reluctantly entered a situation that he specifically attempted to avoid or prevent.⁴⁹ Other examples, such as failed Spartan and Athenian unions, Epidamnus’ rejection of Corcyra’s demands, Corinth’s refusal to withdraw under Corcyra’s conditions, and Melos’ foolish optimism in resisting Athens, round out Lebow’s argument.⁵⁰ He concluded that many of the strategic disputes of *The Peloponnesian War* are remarkably similar to urgings made in favor of political dissuasion in our time.⁵¹ In other words, a student of Thucydidean thought is surprisingly well-equipped to navigate twenty-first century strategic and partisan hotbed topics.

In addition to the interplay between deterrence/compellence and human behavior/political objectives, there exist a very real correlation between commercial/financial power and political/military strength. Such is the subject of Edward Mead Earle’s short essay titled, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power.”⁵² Like Howard and Beyerchen, Earle offers no direct critique of Thucydides but instead indirectly

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Lebow, “Thucydides and Deterrence,” 165.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 167.

⁵¹ Ibid., 165.

⁵² Edward Mead Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 217.

credits the Athenian on a number of accounts. He surmised that in today's world, we must face the interdependency of commerce, economics, and industry on one account, and martial-politico concerns on another.⁵³ Earle felt that this relationship was of significant concern to politicians and bureaucrats, but that martial strength must be considered above all other affairs to preserve the state.⁵⁴ Failure to do so, he hypothesized, would result in economic and material ruin. He went on to identify a series of compelling problems particular to modern Europe, such as mercantilism, laissez-faire economics, imperialism, and unfettered capitalism.⁵⁵ Earle also touched on an eighteenth-century shared opinion that democratic nations and congressional bureaucracies were prone to engage in armed conflict.⁵⁶ He concluded the essay by noting Friedrich List's idea that partisan and fiscal clout were derived from government entitlement programs.⁵⁷ While analyzing Earle's work we once again hear the faint whisper of Thucydides. In *The Peloponnesian War*, Thucydides speaks of the influential importance of wealth and "the strength of Athens being derived from the money brought in by their payments, and *success in war depending principally upon conduct and capital* [emphasis added]."⁵⁸ According to Thucydides, it was the economic, political, and military expansion of Athens that made Sparta suspicious and war with the neighboring giant unavoidable.⁵⁹

Thucydides, of course, receives his fair share of direct praise. United States Air Force Academy Philosophy Professor Martin L. Cook noted that *The Peloponnesian War* is an integral element of many modern day military leadership programs, but one underutilized or otherwise

⁵³ Ibid., 217-8.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 220-6.

⁵⁶ Earle, "Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Fredrich List," 239.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 246.

⁵⁸ Thucydides, *Landmark Thucydides*, 98.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 16.

overlooked in conducting brief cookie-cutter studies.⁶⁰ Cook subsequently built a compelling argument that advocated a more extensive examination of Thucydides.⁶¹ The premise of Cook's thesis was based on a thorough and correct interpretation of *The Peloponnesian War* that lent itself to a program focused on the grooming of senior-level commanders through the examination of evolving "civil-military" relations, cultivating expectations, and developing strategic flexibility.⁶² In practice, Cook taught a tailored course, at the U.S. Army War College, which encompassed the entirety of Thucydides' work.⁶³ Much to his satisfaction, scores of his students found that all of the USAWC's curriculum could be summed up in the pages of *The Peloponnesian War*.⁶⁴ Former Naval War College President Stansfield Turner saw similar potential in studying *The Peloponnesian War*. He asked an audience of students and faculty about the applicability of Thucydides' work in a world where the United States continuously projects military power abroad in the face of diminishing popular support.⁶⁵ Turner drew a very logical conclusion in asserting that such parallels highlight issues still worthy of our attention.⁶⁶ In a related Joint Professional Military Education course concerning strategy and politics, another Naval War College faculty member noted that, while our modern geopolitical environment would be alien and confusing to the ancient Hellenes, the abstract and fundamental forces driving it would not.⁶⁷ The combinations of land and sea powers openly waging war,

⁶⁰ Martin L. Cook, "Thucydides as a Resource for Teaching Ethics and Leadership in Military Education Environments," *Journal of Military Ethics* 5/4 (2006), 353, DOI: 10.1080/15027570601037707.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 353-4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 358-61.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 354.

⁶⁴ Cook, "Thucydides as a Resource for Teaching Ethics and Leadership in Military Education Environments," 354.

⁶⁵ Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner, "Challenge: A New Approach to Professional Education at the Naval War College," *Naval War College Review* 25/2 (Nov-Dec 1972), 4, accessed 9 August 2016, <https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review/Press-Review-Past-Issues.aspx>.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁷ "The Peloponnesian War: Democracy, Leadership and Strategy in a Long War," 50.

while contemplating a number of complicated coalitions and alliances, through the lens of economic and political concerns, were central elements of the Peloponnesian War and exists to this day.⁶⁸

For more than two-thousand years, a variety of intellectuals attempted to emulate and better understand Thucydides; men of letters, from Erasmus to Clausewitz, built upon a legacy of Thucydidean thought. In this essay we discussed Thucydides' contributions to modern academic historiography, human behavior within the context of martial thought, and military theory. Some scholars overtly praised his work, while others indirectly legitimized many of Thucydides' timeless arguments. Modern academia, military professionals, and respected strategists agree with many of his views, ranging from the historiographic process, to his reflections on the human condition, to the interdependent nature of security, economics, politics in today's geopolitical environment, and ethics in leadership. Thucydides undeniably made an enduring impact upon military thought and theory, thus achieving his goal of cementing *The Peloponnesian War* as a true "possession for all time."⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ "The Peloponnesian War," 50.

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