# King Cotton and Queen Victoria

The British Government and the Confederacy, 1860-1863

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The question of possible foreign intervention during the American Civil War has long been an issue of debate among historians of the period. As the largest trading partner of the American South (later styled the Confederate States of America or CSA), the United Kingdom received the heaviest Southern overtures for recognition based on Great Britain's sizeable importation of Southern exports, cotton above all. The thought of disrupted British free trade more than any other impetus led Britain to consider recognition of the Confederacy; however, adequate economic recovery measures calmed this fear, and also the popularity of the Emancipation Proclamation among the working class along with the Union military successes at Gettysburg and Vicksburg in summer 1863 would end the threat of British intervention.

In that light, this essay will be focusing on Great Britain, more accurately the possibility of the British government recognizing the Confederacy as an independent nation and possibly intervening on its behalf. It is by now a widely held belief that there was at least a strong popular movement in Britain supporting the Confederacy, however any motion for recognition or intervention would not be made by a popular vote but at the highest levels of government. For that reason, this essay will not be focusing on popular British breaches of neutrality such as the commerce raiders or the recruitment of British citizens to fight in the war on either side. This essay also will not focus on hypothetical situations, or conspiracy theories of any kind.

At the close of the 1850s, Anglo-American relations appeared to be on the mend. In 1861 the State Department considered the U.S-Canadian border at Puget Sound as well as the possession of the San Juan Islands as the primary issues of contention with Great Britain, hardly an issue of much concern.[1] On the eve of war, relations between the two former enemies appeared to be even cordial. Much of this stemmed from an 1860 tour of Canada and the United

[1] Seward to Adams, 4/10/61. Extracted from: U.S. Department of State. *U.S. Foreign Relations, 1861*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1862, 55. (Hereafter referred to as *USFR 1861*)

States by the nineteen-year-old Prince of Wales (the future Edward VII). His Highness initially travelled incognito as "Lord Renfrew," but Americans appeared more than willing to view him as the heir to the throne of their former enemy. The Prince's visit was greeted with much popular interest, particularly for an instance in which he laid a wreath on George Washington's tomb. Far from reawakening "old Revolutionary animosities," the Prince found himself being treated with "hearty good-will and enthusiasm."[2]

The American economy showed remarkable affection for its former colonial parent: more than three-fifths of all American imports were coming from British dominions and four-fifths of all maritime trade arrived on British ships.[3] In the large Southern ports—Charleston, New Orleans, Wilmington, Norfolk, Galveston—British ships unloaded cheap manufactured goods in exchange for the almighty Southern cotton to fuel Britain's industrial economy. The Southern export economy maintained the region's lifeblood; in 1852-1854 trade between the two countries was measured at £20.5 million, an increase of 287% from the previous decade.[4] In 1860 alone the Northeast and Western states combined exported an estimated $87 million worth of goods while the South exported no less than $229 million.[5] On the eve of war Southern cotton accounted for nearly 80% of Britain's cotton imports, reaching a peak in 1860 of a record 1.1 billion pounds of cotton.[6]

The Southern dominance of the cotton trade was certainly not lost on the Southerners, who recognized industrialized Europe's dependence on them. In that view, they realized they

[2]Seward, vol. 1 pg. 471.
[3] Bernard, Montague. *The Neutrality of Great Britain During the American Civil War*. New York: Lenox Hill, 1971, 122.
[4] Homens, J. Smith. *An Historical and Statistical Account of the Foreign Commerce of the U.S.* New York: G. P. Putnam and Co., 1857, 68.
[5] Bernard, 30.
[6]Carter, Susan B. and Scott Gartner, Michael Haines, Alan Olmstead, Richard Sutch and Gavin Wright, eds. *Historical Statistics of the United States, Volume 5*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 779, 789.

could hold the European nations at their mercy, much as the Arab nations did with oil during the 1970s. "What would happen if no cotton were furnished for three years?" asked South Carolina Senator James Hammond (1807-64) in his famous 1858 speech. "…This is certain: old England would topple headlong and carry the whole civilized world with her…No, you dare not make war on cotton. No power on earth dares to make war upon it. Cotton is king!"[7] The growing Southern realization of their economic power, "King Cotton" as it is popularly known, would become the South's primary strategy for gaining European recognition when war came.

In April 1858, to cement these closer ties with the United States, the Foreign Office appointed Richard Bickerton Pemell Lyons, better known as Lord Lyons (1817-87), as British Minister to the United States. He would remain the British Ambassador until declining health forced him to return to Britain in the spring of 1865. Lyons would prove an admirable representative of Great Britain through his calm demeanor in a crisis. Lyons had been the architect of the Prince of Wales' 1860 North American tour, a feat which earned him praise from President James Buchanan (1791-1868) as well as Queen Victoria (1819-1901), who made him a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George. This title is the highest honor attainable for British diplomats, showing the high degree of the Queen's gratitude. This shows Lyons' resourcefulness and his ability to warm relations between two former enemies, a quality which would not go unnoticed during the war.

As Minister, Lyons' primary duty was not merely to maintain cordial Anglo-American relations but he also served as Britain's primary "eyes and ears" in Washington. After the election of 1860 when it seemed nearly certain that South Carolina would secede from the Union, Lyons wasted no time in informing Foreign Secretary Lord John Russell (1792-1878) of

[7] Surdam, David G. "King Cotton: monarch or pretender: The state of the market for raw cotton on the eve of the American civil war." In *Economic History Review*, L1 (1), 113.

things to come. In a dispatch dated November 25, 1860, he estimated how a civil war might affect Britain's commerce: "The Federal Government may send United States Ships to collect the duties on Vessels and their Cargoes bound to Charleston before they can enter the Port," he warned Russell. "On the other hand, the State of South Carolina may determine upon levying Customs Duties of its own inside the Port. If other States secede, the same thing may happen at other Ports." Later in the same dispatch, he predicted a Union blockade of Southern ports and Britain's commercial fallout from it: "I suppose however that if such a Blockade be regularly established, Foreign Vessels have no other course than to submit to it, at all events until their governments formally announce that they will not recognize it."[8] With this dispatch, Lyons clearly informs the Foreign Office of his prediction of foreign trade interrupted by a civil war. Russell, for his part, urged neutrality in the matter: "Do not seem to favour [*sic*] one party rather than the other," wrote Russell. "…nor express opinions and give advice, unless asked for by the State Governments, in which case the advice should be against all violent action as tending toward civil war."[9] This proves that Britain had been informed of possible action against British trade months before hostilities commenced, and even in the face of this news prepared to remain noncommittal to either side.

Although diplomats were expected to remain neutral, it is possible that Lyons' personal sympathies lay with the abolitionists. "The taint of slavery," he wrote in a dispatch to Lord Russell, "will render the cause of the South loathsome to the civilized world."[10] Lyons' abolitionist sympathies and their effect on his duties as a neutral Ambassador vindicate the popularity of the abolitionist movement in Britain. The question of abolitionism must be

[8] Barnes and Barnes, 237.
[9] Sideman, Belle Becker and Lillian Friedman, eds. *Europe Looks at the Civil War.* New York: The Orion Press, 1960, 19.
[10] Seward, vol. 1 pg. 546. See also: Jenkins, Brian. *Britain and the War for the Union*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974, Vol. 1, pg. 44.

mentioned when discussing Britain's foreign policy during this period, as the idea unquestionably had a hand in her policy-making ability. Britain had abolished slavery in her West African colonies in 1827 and throughout the remainder of British territories with the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833. However it is interesting to note how Britain idealistically abhorred slavery within Britain itself but subtly maintained it in other parts of the Empire—any territories owned by the East India Company, for example, were exempt from the Act. Regardless, religious piety plus a sense of camaraderie for the slaves among Britain's working classes resulted in popular abolitionism throughout Britain. Upon the release of the famous and fateful book *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in 1852, a pirated copy appeared in Britain in less than two months; fifteen more British publishers would release their own editions within five months, and book sales in Britain would top one million—as opposed to 300,000 in the United States, showing the book's popularity overseas.[11] These numbers show the growing tide of popular abolitionism in Britain. Abolitionism would eventually come to work in the Union's favor on the release of the Emancipation Proclamation, but it is important to note how the movement gained strength long before war in North America began.

One of the most uncompromising abolitionists in the United States, William H. Seward (1801-72), had been appointed as Secretary of State under the Lincoln Administration. However, this appeared to Lyons to be an exceptionally bad omen for Anglo-American relations. As a Presidential candidate in the election of 1860, Seward's radical statements had not gone unnoticed by Britain, specifically his statements concerning Britain herself. In the days just before the outbreak of hostilities, Seward had theorized that a war with Britain might unite North

[11] Meer, Sarah. *Uncle Tom Mania: Slavery, Minstrelsy & Transatlantic Culture in the 1850s*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2005, 134.

and South against their traditional enemy.[12] In a dispatch dated January 7, 1861, Lyons appears condescendingly arrogant and apprehensive towards Seward. "With regard to Great Britain, I cannot help fearing he will be a dangerous foreign minister," he warns Russell. "His view of the relations between the United States and Great Britain has always been that they are a good material to make political capital of.…I do not think Mr. Seward would contemplate actually going to war with us, but he would be well disposed to play the old game of seeking popularity here by displaying insolence towards us."[13] As a member of Lincoln's Cabinet, Seward was perceived by some as an arrogant maverick: in his diary, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles comments on how Seward would repeatedly act on his own accord, with no communication to or from the Cabinet and without clear understanding of the issues at hand. "When the Secretary of State, with loose notions of law, usage, and his own legitimate duty, has undertaken to set aside law," wrote Welles, "that is embarrassing."[14] Seward's pugnacity towards Britain and the resulting British suspicion toward him would serve to make Anglo-American relations difficult during the war.

As a result of reports of the harsh anti-Unionist sentiments in the South, Lord Russell began to suspect that no reunification of North and South could be possible, and that Britain could only hope to deal with separate American nations. "I do not see how the United States can be cobbled together by any compromise," he wrote to Lord Lyons in early January 1861. "…I cannot see any mode of reconciling such parties as these. The best thing *now* would be that the right to secede should be acknowledged…I hope sensible men will take this view."[15] Russell's

[12] Ridley, Jasper. *Lord Palmerston*. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1971, 550.
[13] Barnes and Barnes, 239.
[14] Welles, Gideon. *Diary of Gideon Welles, in Three Volumes*. Vol. 1 New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911, 170.
[15] Sideman and Friedman, 19.

acknowledgement of the Confederacy's power reflects his neutral nature, a stance he would maintain throughout the course of the war.

While Lyons and Seward struggled to look past their mutual mistrust, the fledgling Confederate States State Department had been diligently at work sending ministers to foreign countries in the hopes of pleading the Confederacy's case. In March 1861, Confederate President Jefferson Davis (1808-99) appointed Virginian A. Dudley Mann, Georgian William Yancey and French-born Mississippian Pierre Rost as "Confederate commissioners in Europe," by which Davis meant Britain.[16] Upon arrival, the three commissioners ingratiated themselves into Victorian society, dining with and being entertained by the toast of London. The men found an early ally in William H. Gregory (1817-92), an Anglo-Irish landowner and pro-Confederate Member of Parliament (MP) for County Galway in Ireland. Gregory secured the commissioners an unofficial meeting with Lord Russell on May 3 at the latter's house in Belgravia, a lavish London neighborhood primarily inhabited by the rich and powerful. Though the meeting itself represented an important first step in recognition, Russell remained noncommittal. A second meeting on May 9 made little more progress, with Russell only assuring the commissioners he would bring up diplomatic recognition to the Cabinet "as soon as possible."[17] Although the commissioners had not succeeded in their mission with the speed the Confederacy hoped for, their presence in Britain and representation in Parliament would increase the possibility of British recognition.

News of the Confederate presence in London appeared to be precisely the event Seward feared. In a long dispatch to the U.S. Ambassador to Britain, Charles Francis Adams (1807-86) dated May 21, Seward instructed Adams to avoid any dealings, "unofficial as well as official," as

[16] Bennett, John D. *The London Confederates: The Officials, Clergy, Businessmen and Journalists Who Backed the American South During the Civil War*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2008, 25-27.
[17] Bennett, 27.

long as any member of the British government meets with a Confederate agent.[18] He then proceeded to give Adams the orders which would fuel Britain's dislike of Seward even more. "A concession of belligerent rights is liable to be construed as a recognition of them," he wrote, referring to the Confederates. "British recognition would be British intervention, to create within our territory a hostile state by overthrowing this republic itself."[19] Already Seward appeared to be fulfilling Lyons' prediction of hostility towards Britain, and he was not done: "It is, of course, direct recognition to publish an acknowledgement of the Sovereignty and independence of a new power. It is direct recognition to receive its ambassadors, ministers, agents or commissioners, officially."[20] Seward closed with his most blatant threat yet: if Britain officially recognized the Confederacy, he wrote, "we from that hour, shall cease to be friends and become once more, as we have twice before been forced to be, enemies of Great Britain."[21]

Meanwhile, in Washington, the United States began taking measures intent on protecting its own trade yet which threatened to exacerbate foreign aggression against it. The Morrill tariff, sponsored by Pennsylvania Representative James Morrill, had its origins in the recent Panic of 1857 and had been languishing in subcommittee since 1858, yet the election of a Republican Speaker of the House allowed for its passing into law. The previous tariff of 1857 boasted the lowest import duty rates in the 19th century, with a 14.21% import duty in 1861 nearly doubled to 26.08 one year later.[22] Though this new tariff had been passed to raise revenue against the secessionist movement, Britain's free-trade economic policies lay under serious threat by this legislation. German-American businessman August Belmont (1813-90) wrote to Secretary of the

[18] Seward to Adams, 5/21/61. Extracted from: *USFR 1861*, 72.
[19] *Ibid*.
[20] *Ibid*.
[21] Mcpherson, James M. *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1988, 389.
[22] Historical Statistics of the United States. "U.S. Tariff Rates: 1821-1996." Historical Statistics of the United States. <http://pw1.netcom.com/~rdavis2/tariffs.html> (Accessed November 3, 2009)

Treasury Salmon P. Chase (1808-73), in which he quoted British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston (1784-1865): "We do not like slavery, but we need cotton and do not like your tariff."[23] Despite British protests, tariff rates on imported goods would steadily rise even past the conclusion of the war, reaching a whopping high of 46.56% in 1868—a rate unequaled for the remainder of the century.[24] The harsh Morrill Tariff would be the first Union action which hampered British trade in America.

Meanwhile, the outbreak of hostilities increased the Union and Confederate exacerbation of the international situation. In the aftermath of the siege and fall of Fort Sumter, President Lincoln called for 75,000 Union volunteers to put down the rebellion. In response, the Confederate government made its own proclamation on April 17, inviting applications for letters of marque as well as privateers to serve the South.[25] This decision led to the April 19 retaliation of the Lincoln Administration to put in place "a blockade of the ports within the States aforesaid, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and of the Law of Nations in such case provided," making Britain's commercial situation all the more complicated.[26] The blockade, barring any ship from entering or leaving any Southern port, became the topic which first brought the war to Britain's official attention.

On April 29, Earl James Harris, Lord Russell's predecessor as Foreign Secretary, commented in the House of Lords on the outbreak of war and asked if the Foreign Office had made any efforts to prevent the conflict from coming to "a bloody issue," mentioning the war in

[23] August Belmont Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
[24] Historical Statistics of the United States. "U.S. Tariff Rates: 1821-1996." Historical Statistics of the United States. <http://pw1.netcom.com/~rdavis2/tariffs.html> (Accessed November 3, 2009)
[25] Bernard, 77-78.
[26] *Ibid*, 79-80.

Parliament for the first time.[27] Parliament's first mention of any potential British involvement in the war came on May 6 when William Gregory, the MP who had introduced the Confederate delegation to Lord Russell, raised the issue to Lord Russell. Gregory had befriended numerous Southern Congressmen before the war including future Confederate envoy James Mason as well as South Carolinian William P. Miles, making him a prime candidate as the Confederate lobby's mouthpiece in Parliament. Among other war-related issues he posed to the Foreign Secretary, Gregory argued that the Confederacy had earned its independence: "The seven Southern Confederated and Sovereign States having become to the United States a separate and independent foreign Power," was how Gregory referred to them. In Russell's response, he even referred to the South as the "Southern Confederacy," yet maintained his cautious attitude of neutrality.[28]

The political and economic gravity of the situation in America necessitated a Parliamentary response. On May 13, twelve days after news of Lincoln's Declaration of Blockade reached London, Queen Victoria issued a national Proclamation of Neutrality, published the next day in the London Gazette. The only mention of the South came in the phrase "certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America," and the Proclamation based its arguments on the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819.[29] However the most important phrase to the Confederates and their sympathizers remained Victoria's admittance that a state of war existed in America, meaning she and therefore her government recognized the Confederates as belligerents, which Seward (as well as the Confederates and some of their British supporters)

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[27] Hansard MIllbank Systems. "The American States—Question." <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1861/apr/29/question> Hansard Millbank Systems. (Accessed September 19, 2009)

[28] Hansard Millbank Systems. "Blockade of the Southern Confederacy—Question." Hansard MIllbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1861/may/06/question-2> (Accessed September 21, 2009)

[29] Victoria Regina. "By the QUEEN. A PROCLAMATION." The London Gazette. <http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/22510/pages/2046> (Accessed October 5, 2009)

viewed as the first step towards diplomatic recognition. However, Lord Russell viewed the granting as a question "not of principle, but of fact."[30] In response to a question on Southern privateers posed May 2 in the House of Commons, Russell closed by saying: "We have not been involved in any way in that contest by any act or by giving any advice in the matter, and, for God's sake, let us if possible keep out of it!"[31] This statement has been quoted by publications of the era such as Eneas Dallas' magazine *Once A Week*, and also by Civil War historians like Edward Everett and James Mcpherson.[32]

However, the question on the minds of many MPs concerned the effectiveness of this blockade. In *Battle Cry of Freedom*, James Mcpherson states that by June 1861 the Union possessed three dozen blockade ships to contain, by his estimates, "3,500 miles of coastline [including] ten major ports and another 180 inlets, bays, and river mouths navigable by smaller vessels"—in other words, the blockade was spread so thinly that only one in twelve blockade runners was caught.[33] In Stephen Wise's *Lifeline of the Confederacy*, he estimates that out of the approximately 105 attempts to run the blockade between September 1861 and December 1862, seventy-seven were successful.[34]

Regardless of the blockade's effectiveness, its mere presence served as a rallying point for Southerners and sympathizers alike. Robert Bunch, Her Majesty's Consul in Charleston, forwarded to Lord Russell on June 5 a copy of an article in the *Charleston Mercury* explaining a Confederate law banning the exportation of cotton from the Confederacy. According to the

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[30] Mcpherson, James M. and James K. Hogue. *Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009, 239.
[31] Hansard Millbank Systems. "Southern Confederate Letters of Marque—Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1861/may/02/southern-confederation-letters-of-marque#S3V0162P0_18610502_HOC_29> (Accessed October 4, 2009)
[32] Dallas, Eneas S. *Once A Week, Vol. 4.* London: Bradbury and Evans, 1861, 599; Mcpherson, 384.
[33] Mcpherson, 369.
[34] Wise, Stephen R. *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988, 72.

article, the law had been enacted for the specific purpose of getting European powers to break the blockade.[35] Bunch retained a condescending distaste for Southerners throughout the early parts of the decade; on March 21 he wrote Russell that "[the Southerners'] exaggerated idea of the importance of the Southern States to Great Britain is really ludicrous. It actually amounts to the belief, conscientiously entertained, that to withhold the supply of cotton for one year, would be to plunge England into a Revolution which would alter the whole condition of her existence."[36] Bunch's dispatch reflects the skepticism with which the British viewed the Southern self-declared cotton monopoly. In 1860, the British government's free trade policies and American commercial exports had actually given Britain a year's surplus of cotton, a fact noted by multiple historians like Howard Jones and Mary Ellison.[37] William Howard Russell (1820-1907), the *Times*' primary American correspondent, denounced the King Cotton theory as a "grievous delusion," one which mistakenly identifies Britain as "an "appanage [*sic*] of their cotton kingdom," referring to the Confederates.[38] To intervene on behalf of the South "because they keep cotton from us," Lord Russell wrote in September, "would be ignominious beyond measure…No English Parliament would do such a thing."[39]

In Ms. Ellison's analysis of Lancashire during the war years, cotton yarn exports from Britain in 1861 actually exceeded the totals of the previous year, reflecting the 1860 surplus.[40] At the end of 1861 stocks of American cotton in Liverpool admittedly dipped below their prewar levels—from 584,000 bales in 1860 to 477,000 in 1861—yet not enough to cause large-scale

[35] Foreign Office Records, America, II Series. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
[36] *Ibid*.
[37] Surdam, 114; Ellison, Mary. *Support for Secession: Lancashire and the Civil War*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972, 12.
[38] Wise, 11.
[39] Mcpherson, 384-5.
[40] Ellison, 224.

panic.[41] "So nearly are our interests intertwined with America," predicted the *Times* on April 29, "that civil war in the United States means destitution in Lancashire."[42] Although the *Times* would be proven partly correct, the initial failure of the Confederate cotton embargo to affect the British economy meant that the British could hold out long enough to develop alternate cotton sources.

Regardless, the *Times* report reflects how Britain new the embargo would affect the country eventually. Therefore from secession until the *Trent* affair in the winter of 1861, the issue between Britain and the Confederacy remained the issue of how to maintain Britain's maritime trade with the South without violating the Union blockade. As part of the 1856 Congress of Paris ending the Crimean War, the "Great Powers" of Europe signed, in addition to the peace treaty, a Declaration of Maritime Law. This treaty, signed April 16, 1856, enacted the following for all signatories: (1) privateering was outlawed, (2) neutral countries were allowed to ship goods of warring powers, (3) seizure of neutral goods (except war contraband) by enemies was forbidden, and (4) blockades must be effective in order to be legally binding. While the majority of European powers had signed the treaty, the United States had not, unwilling to lose the ability to hire privateers. Montague Bernard, an Oxford lecturer on international law, has stated that though the third and fourth propositions passed into U.S. law, the first and second had attracted much opposition. "The United States had refused to become a party to it, judging that it was not for their interest to relinquish the liberty of using privateers," he concludes.[43] Both the British and French governments needed the Confederacy to sign the Declaration in order to allow British and French merchant ships to reopen the maritime trade lanes and therefore allow Southern cotton to return to Europe. To that end both Henri Mercier, the French Ambassador to

[41] Surdam, 119.
[42] Sideman and Freidman, 37.
[43] Bernard, 171-172.

the United Kingdom, and Lord Lyons attempted to visit William Seward together on June 15 to discuss the matter; Seward, however, demanded to see them separately as he had recently received a report from the American legation at St. Petersburg which suggested a possible Anglo-French alliance for recognition of the Confederacy.[44]

Britain's quest to get Confederate acquiescence to the 1856 Paris Congress led to what has been dubbed the "Bunch Affair." Seward had continually in spring 1861 warned France and Britain that any formal communication or negotiation with the Confederacy would be seen as recognition. Therefore, the Confederacy had to appear to have signed the treaty of its own accord. To accomplish this, both Britain and France in early summer 1861 decided to send one consul with the responsibility of secretly negotiating with the Confederates.[45] Lord Russell nominated Consul William Mure in New Orleans for the task, but Lyons insisted Robert Bunch in Charleston, whom he described as "the best source for Southern news," should be given the task.[46] The plan called for M. de Belligny Ste. Croix, the acting French Consul, to receive the treaty from the British Embassy in Washington, then travel down to Charleston to meet with Bunch – a meeting between two consuls would hardly look suspicious. From there, both consuls would meet with a Confederate delegate in Charleston, who would then travel to Richmond to meet with President Davis. A second courier, a Charleston merchant and naturalized British citizen named Robert Mure (or Muir, in some accounts) would transport the signed treaty to New York and Britain via Louisville and Cleveland. On July 12, 1861, Lyons reported to Russell: "The French consul in Charleston and Mr. Bunch will do the deed."[47]

[44] Seward, vol. 1 pg. 580-581.
[45] Eugene H. Berwanger. *The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War*. Lexington, KT: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994, 38.
[46] Berwanger, 17.
[47] *Ibid*, 39.

As courier for this economically important treaty, Bunch received implicit instructions. He had been authorized by the Foreign Office to indicate that Confederate acceptance of the treaty would indicate an Anglo-Confederate friendship, but could not intimate in any way that the treaty could lead to recognition in the future. Russell originally planned their Confederate contact to be Governor Francis Perkins of South Carolina, as ostentatious travelling would draw suspicion. Bunch protested, suggesting instead William H. Trescott, former secretary of the American legation in London and former Undersecretary of State under the Buchanan Administration. For his reasoning, he cited Trescott's abilities versus Perkins' incompetence (which is debatable) but summed up his argument by writing Russell that Trescott was a "particular friend of [his]." On July 19, Ste. Croix and Bunch met with Trescott, who in his account claims Bunch informed him the treaty represented the first step towards recognition, therefore violating his orders. Despite this change in plans Trescott departed for Richmond one day later, and on the August 14 the Confederate government formally agreed to Articles Two, Three and Four of the Declaration of Paris.[48]

Yet unknown to any of the conspirators, the Union had been aware of the entire plot nearly two weeks before the treaty was signed in Richmond. On August 5, William Seward received intelligence from Cincinnati detailing the plot and naming Robert Mure as the courier for the incriminating evidence.[49] Mure himself had been overheard in Louisville describing his duties as courier, alerting Union intelligence to his mission and whereabouts.[50] New York police apprehended Mure as he neared the docks to sail to Britain. Travelling with a British passport issued by Bunch turned out to be only his first crime; in the diplomatic bag provided by Bunch the police discovered over seventy letters, including letters of introduction as well as pamphlets

[48] Berwanger, 41.
[49] Seward, vol.1 pg. 628.
[50] Berwanger, 42; Jenkins, vol. 1 pg. 15-17

arguing for the dissolution of the Union.[51] More notably, however, an unsigned letter actively mentioning British recognition of the Confederacy proved most incriminating of all. Seward copied a portion of it in his dispatch relating the incident to Adams:

> "Mr. B., on oath of secrecy, communicated to me also that the *first step* to recognition was taken. He and Mr. Belligny together sent Mr. Trescott to Richmond yesterday, to ask Jeff Davis, President, to [accept] the treaty of [commerce], to [accept] the neutral flag covering neutral goods to be respected. This is the first step of direct treating with our Government; so prepare for active business by January 1st."[52]

In the face of her professed neutrality, Britain now faced potential diplomatic disaster. To save face, the Foreign Office had to take as many measures as possible to distance itself from this crisis. Upon Mure's arrest, the Foreign Office feared the American Press might think him the brother of William Mure, Consul in New Orleans, and refused to intervene on behalf of Mure's release. Mure appealed to the New York consul, Sir Edward Archibald, but, on advice from Lord Lyons, Archibald did not intervene. In such a crisis, no Briton had more to lose than Robert Bunch, from whom Seward now intended to revoke his diplomatic privileges as a Consul. Bunch attempted to explain away the letter as a fabrication of the Unionist press, then later by denouncing the letter as "the work of a spy."[53] Finally, Bunch admitted the passport had been fabricated and swore not to issue any passports in the future. As the British government insisted that the anonymous letter did not contain enough proof to arrest him for espionage, the American government eventually reduced its charges against Bunch to one, violation of the Logan Act. An old law, passed in 1799 during the XYZ Affair and tumultuous Quasi-War with France, the Act forbade:

> "Any person, not specially appointed, or duly authorized or recognized, by the President, from counselling[*sic*], advising, aiding, or assisting in any political

[51] Seward, vol. 1 pg. 630.
[52] Seward to Adams, 8/14/61. Extracted from *USFR 1861*, 117.
[53] Berwanger, 43.

> correspondence with the government of any foreign State, with an intent to influence the measures of any foreign government, or of any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of their Government."[54]

Bunch's explanations for his actions satisfied Lord Lyons, but Russell still had his doubts. For one, Bunch never denied that he had made the statement (as Trescott suggested) about the signing of the treaty representing the first step towards Confederate recognition. Bunch's arrogant independence made him infamous in British diplomatic circles; in trying to dissuade Lord Lyons from using Bunch as "Britain's Man" in this affair, Undersecretary Edmund Hammond had described Bunch as "a very perverse or stupid man...not fit for his post."[55] Privately, Russell informed Lyons that even if Seward charged Bunch with violation of the Logan Act, Bunch could not be apprehended by the United States as the Confederates still held Charleston. Despite the British law officers' conclusion that Seward held the legal upper hand, Bunch remained in Charleston until February 1863—sixteen months after Seward had ostensibly withdrawn his *exequatur*.[56] The affair did not deter Bunch from continuing clandestine activities; in early November 1861 Benjamin Moran, secretary of the American legation in London, reported that Bunch had been smuggling secret information back to Britain in covert bags.[57] Despite the threat Bunch and his compatriots represented to the Union, the affair proved that Seward did indeed know the limits of his power (contrary to Lyons' beliefs) which impressed the Foreign Office.

In London, the Confederate legation had been having little success in establishing a diplomatic presence in Britain. News of the unexpected Confederate victory at Manassas/Bull Run reached London on August 5 and caused much celebration by the Confederates and their

[54] Bernard, 185.
[55] Berwanger, 44.
[56] *Ibid*, 45-46.
[57] Benjamin Moran Diary. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

British allies. However, in terms of securing Confederate recognition the victory backfired: many influential Britons, headed by Lord Palmerston, believed that the Confederacy could secure victory on its own.[58] To capitalize on the Confederate victory, President Davis had appointed Ministers James Mason and John Slidell to replace the current Confederate legation, with Mason in London and Slidell in Paris. Mason in particular had experience as a Virginia Congressman and President *pro tempore* of the Senate, though his peers thought him ill-suited for the pomp and excessive ceremony of Europe. "They say," commented South Carolinian author Mary Chestnut, "at the lordliest table Mr. Mason will turn around halfway and spit in the fire!"[59] Mason's rustic character would increase his popularity among the British elite, but decrease the government's ability to take him seriously.

Despite the failure of the Confederate commissioners to provoke popular support for the Confederacy in London, the British government did not support the Union either. In fact, Britain had been preparing for a possible Union attack against Canada. According to historian Jasper Ridley, Palmerston was convinced in early 1861 (before the outbreak of war itself) that the large Union army would subdue the South then annex Canada. "The Yankees will be threatening and violent in Proportion to our local weakness and civil and pacific in Proportion to our growing strength," he wrote on June 23 to Edward Seymour (c.1804-85), the First Lord of the Admiralty, arguing for increased military strength in Canada.[60] Throughout summer and autumn 1861, the Secretary of State for War, Sir George Lewis (1806-63), planned to send three regiments in spring 1862, arriving in North America once the Canadian rivers thawed.

Even after news of the Union defeats at Bull Run and Ball's Bluff reached London in August, Lewis acknowledged the Union threat to Canada was lessened but still advised

[58] Ridley, 551-552
[59] Bennett, 33.
[60] Ridley, 551.

dispatching the regiments.[61] Palmerston agreed with this course, citing the lack of consistency from the Union government. "The only security we can have against wrong insult and aggression on their part must consist in our being strong in our provinces, and in our squadron off their coast," he wrote, adding there were less than ten thousand soldiers in Canada during wintertime. "If we are known to be ready and prepared we shall not be attacked: if we are thought to be weak and imperfectly prepared we shall infallibly brought to grief."[62] As 1861 drew to a close, Anglo-American relations would be drawn into what can easily described as the closest the two powers came to war during this period.

On November 7, Confederate diplomats James Mason and John Slidell left Havana on the British mail steamer RMS *Trent*, en route to Britain. The American Consul-General in Havana, Robert W. Shufeldt, sent a telegram to U.S. Navy Captain Charles Wilkes informing him of the vessel's departure and passengers.[63] Wilkes' ship, the USS *San Jacinto*, left harbor and lay in wait for the *Trent*, stopping her at gunpoint near the Bahamas in the early afternoon of November 8.[64] After being stopped and searched, Mason and Slidell as well as their secretaries James McFarland and George Eustis stepped forward and announced their identities, as well as their status under British protection. If they were to go on board the *San Jacinto*, Slidell announced, they would have to be taken by force. This did not sway the crew of the *San Jacinto*, which far outgunned the *Trent*, and so Mason, Slidell, their secretaries and families were forcibly

[61] University of Southampton. "Letter from Sir G.C.Lewis to Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston, regarding gun trials, the threat of rebellion in Hungary, the American Civil War, and arrangements for sending troops to Canada, 27 August 1861" University of Southampton. <http://www.archives.soton.ac.uk/palmerston/results.php?count=6> (Accessed March 1, 2010)
[62] University of Southampton. "Letter from Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston, to Sir G.C.Lewis concerning rifle design, relations with America, and the despatch [*sic*] of troops to Canada, 26 August 1861" University of Southampton. <http://www.archives.soton.ac.uk/palmerston/results.php?count=13> (Accessed March 8, 2010)
[63] Bernard, 190.
[64] *Ibid*, 189.

taken off the *Trent* and returned to America. In his account of the incident, Captain Wilkes expressed neither regret for the incident nor any knowledge of the implications of his actions; indeed, he explains he had intended to take the *Trent* as a whole back to Key West as a prize, but "the reduced number of passengers on board, bound to Europe, who would be put to great inconvenience, decided me to allow them to proceed."[65] At no point in his account did Captain Wilkes claim he had been ordered by any authority to capture the *Trent* or in any way apprehend Mason and Slidell.

Understandably, Anglo-American relations plummeted overnight. On November 28, the day after news of the incident reached London, the *Morning Chronicle* denounced Lincoln as a "feeble, confused, and little minded mediocrity" and suggested that the Union expel Lincoln and Seward; if not, "their only chance of fame consists in the probability that the navies of England will blow out of the water their blockading squadrons, and teach them how to respect the flag of a mightier supremacy beyond the Atlantic."[66] In Canada, much closer to possible Union attack, the Toronto *Globe* denounced the event as "one of the most absurd and stupid acts which history records."[67]

Although the British press was outraged at this breach of international law, the Union appeared not to fully grasp the magnitude of the situation as the British government did. Captain Wilkes received a hero's welcome upon his return, and Seward instructed Ambassador Adams in London to abstain from talking about the affair. A discussion, "if there is one," as Seward told Adams, would take place in Washington.[68] Seward's comments clearly revealed his flippant attitude towards the incident. Gideon Welles, who would later describe Wilkes as "ambitious,

[65] Bernard, 191.
[66] Sideman and Friedman, 101.
[67] Jenkins, vol. 1 pg. 200.
[68] Seward, vol. 2, p. 21.

self-conceited, and self-willed," wrote him a congratulatory letter.[69] However, the euphoria of the event wore off quickly. "If Great Britain shall now protest against the act, and demand their release," commented President Lincoln, "we must give them up, apologize for the act as a violation of our doctrines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has been wrong for sixty years."[70] Britain saw the desire to finally subjugate the United States once and for all. John Thadeus Delane, editor of the violently anti-American *The Times*, summed up the mood of the ultra-conservatives in a December letter to William Russell. "It is real, downright, honest desire to avenge old scores; not the paltry disasters of Baltimore and New Orleans, but the foul and incessant abuse of the Americans, statesmen orators and press," he wrote on December 11, at the height of the crisis. "…We expect, however, that they will show fight—and *hope* it, for we trust we will give them such a dusting that even Everett, Bancroft and Co won't be able to coin victories out of their defeats."[71]

It is possible that the lack of an immediate Union apology for the incident further exacerbated the incident: although Seward claimed (correctly, it appears) Wilkes did not act on orders, no Union government agency made any attempt to release Mason and Slidell or in any way alleviate their condition. Not until November 30 did any action by the Foreign Office take place, in which Russell instructs Lyons to demand "the liberation of the four gentlemen, and their delivery to your Lordship in order that they may again be placed under British protection, and a suitable apology for the aggression which has been committed."[72]

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[69] Welles, 86.
[70] Mahin, Dean B. *One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War*. Washington: Brassey's, 1999, p. 62
[71] Allen, H.C. "Civil War, Reconstruction, and Great Britain." In *Heard Round the World: The Impact Abroad of the Civil War*, edited by H.C. Allen et al. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968, pg. 67.
[72] Bernard, 192-193.

William Seward's friend and political ally, Thurlow Weed, had been acting as an "unofficial envoy" in Britain and France and in the coming weeks his council and intelligence would prove more vital than ever. On December 2 he wrote from London that "the indignation is wild and permeates all classes," with regard to the affair, and that a "high source" in London claimed the United States intended to declare war on Canada. "You are in a 'tight place,'" he warned Seward, "and I pray that you may be imbued with the wisdom the emergency requires."[73] Soon after, Weed received a letter from a "Mr. Evans," possibly Sir De Lacy Evans, a long-serving MP for Westminster as well as a British Army General with over forty years of experience. The letter revealed the existence of an "organized movement in Parliament, for a recognition of the Confederate States, and the consequent negation of the blockade, under a provision in the treaty of Paris in 1815, prohibiting the blockade of rivers running through two countries."[74] All evidence pointed to war with Britain unless the situation could be swiftly expedited. On December 8, August Belmont wrote his friend Secretary Chase and warned that "a war with England is inevitable unless the Rebel commissioners are given up."[75]

While Palmerston threatened and the diplomats bickered, the military prepared for war. As previously mentioned, British reinforcements had been departing to Canada as far back as June 1861 when the War Office ordered two regiments and a field artillery battery to depart for Canada to guard against a possible Union attack on Canada.[76] Later, Lord Palmerston himself raised that quota to three regiments.[77] On December 14, British abolitionist and labor activist

[73] Seward, vol. 2, pg. 27-28.
[74] *Ibid*, pg. 32.
[75] August Belmont Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
[76] Hansard Millbank Systems. "Troops for Canada—Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1861/jun/11/question-1> (Accessed October 4, 2009)
[77] University of Southampton. "Letter from Sir G.C.Lewis to Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston, regarding gun trials, the threat of rebellion in Hungary, the American Civil War, and arrangements for sending troops to Canada, 27 August 1861." University of Southampton. <http://www.archives.soton.ac.uk/palmerston/results.php?count=6> (Accessed October 10, 2009)

John Bright (1811-89) wrote to Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner (1811-74), a fellow abolitionist and close friend. "This Government is ready for war as an excuse my be found for it…If you are resolved to succeed against the South, *have no war with England;* make every concession that can be made."[78] Thurlow Weed revealed to Seward how the plan called for Portland, Maine to be struck first in a letter dated December 18 containing information "of a nature so important…that I do not deem it safe in the post-office here."[79]

On receiving word that Mason, Slidell and their secretaries had been transported to Fort Warren in Boston Harbor, Russell and the Foreign Office framed Britain's response. At the end of November, Russell wrote a draft of a dispatch to Lyons demanded the release of the four Confederates into British custody, threatening to sever diplomatic ties within seven days if the demands were not met. In addition, he advised Lord Lyons to coordinate any response with Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander Milne, commanding the Royal Navy's American Squadron based in Halifax.[80] British plans to ship troops to Canada shifted into overdrive, while the Canadians prepared to raise militia forces. Lord Lyons fueled this military buildup by advising to Russell, in one of his first dispatches following the eruption of the scandal, that the Union government might be more inclined to release the commissioners if Britain adopted an aggressive policy.[81] The Duke of Newcastle, serving as Colonial Secretary, wrote to Lord Monck, Governor of Canada. The Duke promised the arrival of a British force in the spring, plus uniforms and 100,000 Enfield rifled muskets for Canadian militia.[82]

The situation might have disintegrated even further if not for the tragic death of Prince Albert, the Prince Consort and Husband to Queen Victoria. By the end of 1861, the Prince had

[78] Sideman and Friedman, 103.
[79] Seward, vol.2 pg. 30.
[80] Bernard, 192-193.
[81] Winks, Robin W. *Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years*. Montreal: Harvest House, 1971, 80-81.
[82] *Ibid*.

grown increasingly ill from typhoid fever and appeared to be on his deathbed. On the evening of November 29, he read the draft of Lord Russell's new dispatch to Lord Lyons, spending a sleepless night revising it—as the Queen described it in her journal, he was hardly able to hold his pen.[83] With the Prince's revisions, the British government was willing to overlook the disaster if the United States government admitted that Captain Wilkes had acted without orders. The new draft, sent November 30, still demanded that the prisoners be released, but did not carry the uncompromising overtones of its predecessor.

Presented with this compromise, the Union government eagerly accepted the British terms. The usually pugnacious Seward had now been placed on the defensive, now that he had finally been presented with the thought of fighting two separate powers. President Lincoln, however, summed up the government's opinion of the crisis with a single sentence: "One war at a time." Meanwhile in Britain, Prince Albert's revisions had been received amiably, even by Palmerston, according to a letter sent to Albert by Liberal Party leader Earl Granville.[84] The cooler heads had, to use the expression, prevailed, and none too soon. Shortly before the Foreign Office sent the November 30 dispatch to Washington, the Admiralty had sent instructions to the Royal Navy to prepare for action; in Washington, French Foreign Minister Thouvenel had assured Ambassador Mercier that France would stand by Britain in any conflict which would grow out of the incident.[85] Prince Albert himself would die before the end of the year, on December 14. It should be noted that the breakdown of the Transatlantic telegraph cable greatly aided the calm negotiation of this crisis, through its forcing leaders on both sides to take time considering their diplomatic moves. Were it not for this technical malfunction, the crisis might have proceeded quite differently.

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[83] Pound, Reginald. *Albert: A Biography of the Prince Consort*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973, 344.
[84] *Ibid*.
[85] Seward, vol. 2 pg. 34.

Privately, however, the British were far less prepared for war than they could admit. Despite the Colonial Secretary's promise of British forces backed by Canadian militiamen, Britain could only afford to send 11,000 infantry throughout the entire crisis—hardly sufficient to defend the frontier.[86] "We are not, it is true, in a condition for war with Great Britain just at this time," Gideon Welles recorded in his diary, "but England is scarcely in a better condition for a war with us."[87] Historian Robin Winks has proposed Britain's lack of commitment to an American war was due to overextension and pressures abroad: In Europe Prussia was threatening the balance of power, while Japan was making advances in the Pacific and Britain herself was still recovering from the grievous losses from the Crimean War.[88] Regardless, Palmerston refused to withdraw British forces even as late as July 1862, undoubtedly fearing an international loss of face from a withdrawal.[89]

Though the successful mediation of the *Trent* affair had narrowly averted British recognition of the Confederacy and intervention on its behalf, the blockade and continued inability of the Union to effectively crush the Confederacy sustained the threat of foreign intervention. As Confederate Generals Lee and Jackson continued to derail Union hopes for victory, the Lincoln administration began contemplating changing the war aims from simply preserving the Union to abolishing slavery as well. Both Britain and France maintained far more abolitionist sympathies than the United States due to both countries' industrial economies and Seward likely realized that a Union abolitionist policy would renew much of the Union's lost appeal abroad. Thurlow Weed advised Seward from Paris that the French government viewed

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[86] Winks, 82.
[87] Welles, 79.
[88] *Ibid*, 80.
[89] Hansard Millbank Systems. "Troops in Canada—Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1862/jul/11/troops-in-canada-question> (Accessed October 11, 2009)

slavery perhaps even more seriously than any other. "The Tariff is a stumbling block...but this is not more, or perhaps *as* serious, as the slavery question," he wrote on January 26th. "If ours was avowedly a war of Emancipation, this Government would sympathize with and aid us."[90] This reflects the Lincoln administration's embryonic forays into popular abolitionism.

As the Union struggled with the possibility of abolitionism, the Confederate government continued to hope that the lack of Southern cotton exports to Britain would "starve" the country economically and force the Royal Navy to break the blockade. Much has been made of the Lancashire "cotton famine," which by most accounts reached its peak in November 1862. Full-time employment dropped 503,000 to 200,000 between November 1861 and 1862, but bounces back to 286,000 in December 1863 and eventually to 344,300 in May 1865.[91] These statistics did not verify that Lancashire was recovering at the rate most may have liked, but the situation does show that the situation in Lancashire was not as bad as some thought. In her opening speech to Parliament in January 1863, Queen Victoria even admitted that the situation in Lancashire was indeed improving.[92]

The Confederates certainly overestimated Britain's dependence on American cotton, as Britain had seen the possibility of an American monopoly on Britain's cotton import and consequently taken measures to expand markets. The idea went back decades: in June 1828, a Liverpool correspondent for the President of the Board of Trade warned of "the precarious situation of the cotton trade of this country from our great dependence on the United States for the supply of the raw material."[93] In 1857, during the largest period of American cotton exportation to date, a group of merchants and businessmen formed the Manchester Cotton

[90] Seward, vol.2 pg. 57.
[91] Foner, Philip S. *British Labor and the American Civil War.* New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981, 5.
[92] Adams to Seward, 2/5/63. Extracted from: U.S. Department of State. *United States Foreign Relations, 1863*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864, pg. 106-109. (Hereafter referred to as *USFR 1863*)
[93] Owen, Roger. *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969, 96-97.

Supply Association, dedicated to extending the supply of cotton by finding new trade partners. Egypt, with its warm but dry climate presented an excellent source for growing cotton, and the country had been increasingly shifting its agricultural sector to cotton production. Britain had been heavily investing in Egypt's development in the years before the war; between 1846 and 1852, trade revenue between the two countries jumped an unbelievable 456%.[94] In August 1861, only four months after the outbreak of hostilities, the Association made its first moves abroad. Mr. G.R. Haywood, the Association's Secretary, visited Egypt and pledged the assistance of the Association in increasing Egypt's cotton production. The Association would later ship £71,000 worth of machinery to Egypt, to be used for cotton-producing purposes.[95]

With the coming of the Union blockade, British interest in Egyptian cotton as an alternate source skyrocketed. So too, consequently, did British economic aid to Egypt for this effort. While the Egyptians themselves increased the number of cotton plants picked, Britain exported machinery to Egypt for processing the cotton. In 1861 Egypt imported 9,000 steam engines; the next year that number had risen to close to 60,000, then to 161,000 in 1863 and peaking at 370,000 in 1865.[96] Meanwhile, the number of steam-powered ginning factories in Egypt jumped from twenty-four in June 1862 to eighty in January 1863—more than tripling the number in just six months.[97] The results are self-evident. Egyptian cotton, 93% of the country's exports, jumped from 12 million pounds in 1861 to 24 million in 1863, eventually to 40 million in 1865.[98] Egypt was not the only alternate source of cotton for Britain; according to Charles Francis Adams, so many alternate sources had been contracted that "a probability of a sudden reopening of our ports

[94] Carter et al, 68.
[95] Owen, 97-98.
[96] *Ibid*, 100.
[97] *Ibid*, 106.
[98] Haroun, Ali Ahmed. *Cotton in the Egyptian Economy*. Louvain-la-Nueve, Belgium: Université Catholique de Louvain, 1979, 68.

is beginning to be viewed with quite as much of apprehension as desire," he reported wryly in December 1862.[99] Also, Britain was beginning to receive cotton shipments from Southern ports in Union hands, such as Beaufort and Port Royal in North Carolina, both captured in late 1861 to early 1862.[100] The most notable capture by far was New Orleans, captured by Union forces in April 1862: the city's import revenues bounced back from $29.7 million to $79.2 million after the reopening of the port.[101] These economic successes highlight the improving situation and diminished the need for British recognition/intervention due to a domestic recession in Britain.

Yet despite these amphibious victories along the coast, the Union was still unable to subdue the Confederacy. The Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by the famous General George McClellan (1826-85) advanced towards Richmond at a snail's pace, while Union successes in Tennessee and along the Mississippi River slowly gained ground against the Confederacy. Great Britain's primary interest in the conflict, the Union blockade, had remained a source of great contention. However with the Union strategy of taking control of Confederate ports, commerce to and from important Southern ports such as Norfolk and especially New Orelans could resume. The removal of the blockade from not only New Orleans but also Port Royal and Beaufort, North Carolina (the second-largest deep-water port in the state, behind Wilmington) in May 1862 provided not only reintroduced means of commerce, but also allowed the strengthening Union blockade to consolidate on those ports still outside Union control.[102]

Due to the increasing stringency of the Union blockade, it still became the primary topic of contention Britain had with the Union after the resolution of the *Trent* Affair. Charles Francis Adams warned Seward that upon the House of Commons' resumption on January 16 it would be

[99] Adams to Seward, 12/4/62. *USFR 1863*, 11-12.
[100] Anderson, Bern. *By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the Civil War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962, 58-61.
[101] Capers, Gerald M. *Occupied City: New Orleans Under the Federals, 1862-1865*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1965, 147.
[102] Sideman and Friedman, 183

"impossible to avoid" a discussion of American affairs and therefore the blockade.[103] Though the death of Prince Albert understandably delayed Parliamentary activities early in the year, on February 7 the issue of the blockade was raised again, somewhat predictably, by William Gregory, the MP for Galway who had introduced the Confederate legation to Lord Russell two years previously. Gregory, acting as the unofficial leader of the MPs sympathetic to the Confederacy, asked for a reevaluation of the blockade, dramatically producing a document which "gave him reason to believe that more than a doubt existed as to whether this blockade was effective."[104] Gregory argued that the Union blockade was ineffective, or a "paper blockade," and therefore could not be enforced. However, the United States had not signed the 1856 Declaration of Maritime Law, which outlawed paper blockades, and thus could not be held accountable to a treaty the country did not sign. Admiral John Walcott, MP for Christchurch, declared that due to the *Trent* Affair, "it will be long before any nation will indulge in England's decrepitude," but that he was thankful that the affair had been concluded peaceably.[105]

The debate sparked by Mr. Gregory marked the first of many inquiries on the state of the Union blockade and its legality. Finally on March 7 Gregory put forward a motion to enter into correspondence with the Confederate government regarding the blockade, meaning under this motion Great Britain would acknowledge the Confederacy as a sovereign power independent of the United States. In addition Britain would enter into negotiation with the Confederate government regarding possibly breaking the Union blockade, the ultimate goal of the Confederate ministers. However, as history shows, the motion failed soundly. Thurlow Weed

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[103] Seward, vol. 2, pg. 40-41.
[104] Hansard Millbank Systems. "United States—Blockade of the Southern Ports." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1862/feb/07/united-states-blockade-of-the-southern> (Accessed October 5, 2009)
[105] Hansard Millbank Systems. "United States—Blockade of the Southern Ports." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1862/feb/07/united-states-blockade-of-the-southern> (Accessed October 5, 2009).

reported smugly to Seward on the motion's failure, pointing out that it had been raised by MPs who had links to businesses threatened by the Union blockade, for example shipping and textiles.[106] The idea of British recognition of intervention was due to the rising tide of Anglo-American comradeship over abolitionism.

Both sides realized that in the aftermath of the *Trent* Affair, the best way to reestablish good relations was to act in concert against the common enemy of Britain and the United States—the slave trade, if not slavery itself. As early as February 1862, Seward had contemplated a new treaty for the suppression of the slave trade, reporting to James Harvey, the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, that the treaty was "far better than the Ashburton treaty," referring to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty signed in 1842.[107] Two months later on April 7, 1862, Seward and Lord Lyons both signed the aptly named "Treaty between the United States and Great Britain for the Suppression of the African Slave Trade." The treaty, ratified by the Senate less than a year later on March 5, 1863, greatly increased the cooperative powers of both nations versus the slave trade and contributed to its downfall.[108] "If the South remains besotted and refuses to return to the Union, the consequences will be terrible," Seward wrote April 18, eleven days after the successful signing of the treaty. "*If nothing but the destruction of the Government will satisfy slavery, nothing short of the destruction of slavery will satisfy the Northern people*."[109] Seward's statement here reflects the Lincoln administration's growing propensity towards complete abolitionism, though the end result was still months away.

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[106] Seward, vol. 2, pg. 75
[107] *Ibid*, 52.
[108] Yale Law School. "Avalon Project-British-American Diplomacy: Treaty Between United States and Great Britain for the Suppression of the Slave Trade, April 7, 1862." Lillian Goldman Law Library. <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1862.asp> (Accessed October 10, 2009)
[109] Seward, vol.2, pg. 86

With war averted through the successful diffusion of the *Trent* Affair and diplomatic efforts now resuming, the worst threats of recognition had passed. By this point, it appeared that intervention by Britain was not necessary. Enough ships had been added to the Union blockade that Lord Russell acknowledged its legality in Parliament on February 15.[110] With the increased tightening of the Union blockade around the few ports remaining in Confederate hands, blockade running was becoming much riskier and cotton imports were beginning to return to Britain.

However, the situation would turn sour through a combination of two factors. The first was the Lancashire "cotton famine," which finally began to hit Britain in early 1862. By July, cotton stocks were at one-third their usual level and 75% of cotton workers were either unemployed or on reduced time; William Gladstone openly favored intervention to stop the war and resume cotton imports.[111] Full-time employment of workers dropped from 553,950 in November 1861 to 203,200 one year later.[112] However, historians such as James Mcpherson and H.C. Allen have argued that the British cotton industry had been declining before the war began, and unemployed cotton workers could find alternate employment in the booming wartime industries shipping illegal military goods to the South—wool, iron, shipbuilding and armament manufacture were among the largest.[113] Despite this recent discovery, at the time the economic situation appeared quite dire.

The second factor which worsened the situation was the continued Union failure to destroy the Confederacy as a whole. The failure of General McClellan's Peninsula Campaign, the Seven Days' Battle and especially the disastrous Union defeat at Second Manassas/Bull Run gave the British an image (heavily expounded by the Confederate sympathizers) that the

[110] Mcpherson and Hogue, 240.
[111] Mcpherson, 548
[112] Foner, 5.
[113] See Mcpherson, 386; Allen, 21.

Confederates were defending their homes against a numerically superior enemy. In late summer the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia embarked on an invasion of Union-held Maryland and threatened Washington. With this action demonstrating the strength of the Confederate military, Palmerston became slowly more open to the idea of mediation or possibly recognition of the Confederacy. Theoretical borders were drawn up between a postwar United States and Confederate States, dividing Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri between the two nations.[114] In a letter to Gladstone dated September 24, 1862, the Prime Minister suggests a proposal made to both the Union and Confederacy involving an armistice and ending of the blockade. "If both declined, we must of Course leave them to go on," Palmerston mused to his colleague. "If the South accepted and the North declined we should then I conceive acknowledge the Independence of the South." However, he also believes that Britain should maintain neutrality even after recognizing the South.[115]

However, Palmerston's letter would prove to be premature, as the Lincoln Administration had realized abolition was the key to preventing foreign recognition of or intervention on behalf of the South. The Lincoln Administration's actions regarding slavery are a completely separate topic and therefore will not be addressed here. Yet it cannot be denied that the Proclamation had the largest effect on pro-Union support in Britain and elsewhere. The Lincoln Administration had been searching for an opportunity to enact the proclamation, but it needed to be on the heels of a Union victory so to not look like an act of desperation. The Battle of Antietam/Sharpsburg on September 17, when Union forces turned back the Confederate invasion of the North with great loss on both sides, provided such an opportunity. It may not have been the sweeping victory Lincoln had hoped for, but a victory nonetheless. Five days later on September 22, Lincoln made

[114] Guedalla, *Gladstone and Palmerston*, 230-231
[115] *Ibid*, 232-233.

the famous (preliminary) proclamation freeing all slaves held by the Confederacy, holding that any slave in Confederate territory would be freed January 1.[116]

However, it would take serious time before Britain realized the ultimate effect of Lincoln's actions. In response to Lincoln's preliminary proclamation in September, the *Times* argued that Lincoln had signed the act intending to provoke a slave revolt and punish the South for seceding.[117] Upon the resumption of Parliament on February 5, 1863, the House of Lords did not mention the Proclamation at all, focusing instead on foreign policy issues in Greece.[118] In the House of Commons, Frederick Calthrope of Worcestershire, in what would be his only speech in Parliament, commended Lincoln on the Proclamation; however, his fellow MPs chose to concentrate on revenue issues for the remainder of the debate.[119]

Realistically, the Proclamation was an empty promise; nearly all slaves in the areas affected by the Proclamation were still behind Confederate lines and would not be freed for years. Internationally, however, it had just the effect Lincoln needed. "There can be no doubt that these manifestations are the genuine expressions of the feeling of the religious, and of the working classes of Great Britain," wrote Charles Francis Adams triumphantly from London. "The political effect of them is not unimportant."[120] With the Emancipation Proclamation, the United States had correctly judged the mood of both its citizens at home and the popular mood abroad. Through its changing of the war aims from preservation of the Union to ending slavery,

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[116] National Archives and Records Administration. "Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 1862." National Archives and Records Administration. <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals_iv/sections/transcript_preliminary_emancipation.html> (Accessed March 29, 2010)

[117] Sideman and Friedman, 192.

[118] Hansard Millbank Systems. "Address to Her Majesty on the Lord's Commissioners' Speech." Hansard Millbank Systems, <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1863/feb/05/address-to-her-majesty-on-the-lords> (Accessed March 24, 2010)

[119] Hansard Millbank Systems. "Address to Her Majesty on the Lord's Commissioners' Speech." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1863/feb/05/address-to-her-majesty-on-the-lords> (Accessed March 24, 2010)

[120] Seward, vol. 2, 158.

the Lincoln Administration had almost completely ended the threat of foreign intervention with the stroke of a pen.

In January, once the British press realized Lincoln was in fact serious about mass emancipation, the public became overwhelmingly supportive of the measure. By the end of January 1863, Charles Francis Adams reported anti-slavery meetings in London, Yorkshire and Gloucestershire; within a week more meetings followed in Bradford, Bristol and Glasgow.[121] In his dispatch to Washington, Adams excitedly reported that "There has been nothing like it here since the time of the anti-corn law meetings."[122] As the meetings grew, so did their grievances against the British government. A meeting in Manchester in early March denounced the "illegal enterprise of building and fitting our piratical ships in aid of the American slaveholders' confederacy, contrary to public policy, national honor, and the Queen's Proclamation of neutrality."[123] This was the first direct mention of British involvement in the construction of the commerce raiders, and also the changing of name from the "Southern states" to the "American Slaveholders' Confederacy" should be noted. At a meeting in Edinburgh in late February, Union supporters denounced President Davis as "the Mississippi fire-eater" (an accusation greeted by laughter, hisses and cheers, according to the minutes of the meeting) and James Mason as "author of the Fugitive Slave Bill."[124] However, the turning point may have come on March 26, when John Bright chaired a meeting of trade union leaders at St. James' Hall in London, organized by the London Trades' Council and attended by between 2,500 and 3,000. This

[121] Adams to Seward, 1/30/63; 2/5/63. Extracted from: *USFR 1863*, 97, 100-101.
[122] Adams to Seward, 1/30/63. Extracted from: *USFR 1863*, 97.
[123] Adams to Seward, 3/3/63. Extracted from: USFR, *1863*, 136.
[124] Foner, 56.

meeting, according to British Labor historian Royden Harrison, firmly cemented the working classes behind the Union and convinced trade union leaders of the "value of political action."[125]

With the massive popular support for the Emancipation Proclamation, the government was threatened. Palmerston's Liberal-dominated Cabinet would not remain in office if it continued supporting a group which was ostensibly fighting for the preservation and spread of slavery. In response to the disastrous Union defeat at Chancellorsville and subsequent second Confederate incursion into Union territory, Parliament again debated the notion of Confederate recognition. On June 30, John Roebuck from Sheffield petitioned the House of Commons "to enter into negotiations with the great Powers of Europe, with the object of recognizing the Confederate States of America."[126] Roebuck painted a vivid picture of an imminent Confederate victory and Washington in danger, and his measure was supported by influential Cabinet members such as William Gladstone and Lord Robert Gascoyne-Cecil (1830-1903), the future Lord Salisbury, who belittled the Emancipation Proclamation and claimed the Union was trying to make Britain dependant on Union trade. However, other MPs such as Robert Montagu (1825-1902) and William Forster (1818-82) argued that any mediation would necessitate landing troops to separate the warring armies, meaning mediation in essence meant intervention. Furthermore, they argued that Britain should wait until news from Union-besieged Vicksburg, and also what would become of the Confederate incursion into Pennsylvania. Clearly, Parliament remembered the first incursion one year previously and did not wish to make premature judgments.[127]

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[125] Foner, 56-59.

[126] Hansard Millbank Systems. "Recognition of the Southern Confederacy." Hansard Millbank Systems. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1863/jun/30/resolution (accessed September 20, 2009)

[127] Hansard Millbank Systems. "The Adjourned Debate. Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1863/jul/10/the-adjourned-debate-question> (Accessed March 29, 2010)

Despite the lack of news from America, Palmerston delayed the debate and the motion itself was withdrawn on July 10, Parliament having sensed that a major battle was drawing near. "Events of the utmost importance are about to take place in America, and we may hear in the course of a few hours of results commensurate with the importance of those events," argued Palmerston. "Evidently, then, the present is not a proper moment to ask the Government to prejudice itself with respect to its free action."[128] Due to the Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, this debate was never resumed, but it is important to note how the debate was closed even before news of the victories reached London. With the war evidently turning in favor of the Union, the question of recognition never again surfaced in Parliament.

In conclusion, Britain initially considered recognizing the Confederacy as an independent nation in order to resume economic trade with the South. However upon the release of the Emancipation Proclamation by the Lincoln Administration and the subsequent turning of the tide in the Union's favor, sweeping popular support effectively ended the power of the Confederate lobby in Britain. Combined with economic countermeasures to lessen the severity of the Confederate cotton embargo, Britain was able to maintain her official neutrality and the Confederate lobby in Britain never recovered its popular support for the remainder of the war.

[128] Hansard Millbank Systems. "The Adjourned Debate. Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1863/jul/10/the-adjourned-debate-question> (Accessed March 29, 2010)

## Annotated Bibliography

Allen, H.C. "Civil War, Reconstruction, and Great Britain." In *Heard Round the World: The Impact Abroad of the Civil War,* edited by H.C. Allen et al. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968

H.C. Allen here presents a somewhat convoluted but concise analysis of Britain during the civil war as part of this larger work on the international aspects of the war.

Anderson, Bern. *By Sea and by River: The Naval History of the Civil War*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962

In this naval analysis of the war, Bern Anderson provides vital clues relating to the blockade and also the Union campaigns against Confederate ports such as Beaufort and New Orleans, plus histories of the occupations of those towns.

August Belmont Papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

The testimony of German-American businessman and Unionist August Belmont, in his correspondence with Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, represents an important gauge to the popular mood both at home and abroad. His observations and advice help form a basis on British popular opinion, which influenced political decision-making.

Barnes, James J., and Patience P. Barnes. *Private and Confidential: Letters from British Ministers to the Foreign Secretaries in Washington, 1844-67.* Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Press, 1993.

The husband and wife team of Patience and James Barnes have compiled the letters of all British Ambassadors from 1844 to 1867. Not only does this book give a more intimate picture of Lord Lyons, with the letters of the preceding Ambassadors they give insight to the issues between Great Britain and the United States on the eve of war.

Benjamin Moral Diary. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Benjamin Moral served as secretary to the United States legation in London throughout the entire Civil War, and therefore occupies a unique perspective on events and individuals of the time. His description of the *dramatis personae,* interpretation of events and reports on important decisions aid greatly in discerning my thesis.

Bennett, John D. *The London Confederates: The Officials, Clergy, Businessmen and Journalists Who Backed the American South During the Civil War*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2008.

This new analysis presents a look at not only the Confederate presence in London but also those British citizens who sympathized. At the end of the book the author has compiled a list of all the pro-Confederate MPs in both Houses of Parliament, giving the historian the opportunity to examine the sympathizers and their reasons behind lobbying for recognition.

Bernard, Montague. *The Neutrality of Great Britain During the American Civil War*. New York: Lenox Hill, 1971. (Originally published 1870)

Compiled by British diplomatic historian and international law expert Montague Bernard, this book examines the neutrality of Britain during the war from a diplomatic standpoint, looking at the legality of all issues and presenting all international diplomatic incidents in a more polished light.

Berwanger, Eugene H. *The British Foreign Service and the American Civil War*. Lexington, KT: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994.

Eugene Berwanger presents in this book a succinct and complete examination of the British Foreign Service during the war, complete with analyses of Lord Lyons, the Bunch Affair and the *Trent* Affair. His personal description of Lord Lyons is particularly impressive and revealing of the man's character, giving greater insight into this figure so important to my topic.

Capers, Gerald M. *Occupied City: New Orleans Under the Federals, 1862-1865*. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1965

Gerald Capers presents a glimpse into the occupation of New Orleans, particularly the reopening of the port and resumption of commercial maritime trade.

Carse, Robert. *Blockade: The Civil War at Sea*. New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1958.

Naval Historian Robert Carse presents with this book not only a comprehensive look at the blockade but also personal accounts of blockade running. Using his skill as a naval historian, Carse effortlessly presents a look at the blockade anyone wishing to understand more on the subject must read.

Carter, Susan B. and Scott Gartner, Michael Haines, Alan Olmstead, Richard Sutch and Gavin Wright, eds. *Historical Statistics of the United States, Volume 5*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

This five-volume work, the definitive reference on American economic statistics, contains the most authoritative sources on American imports and exports, with a specific section on the Civil War. For this reason, it was imperative to consult this book when seeking any type of statistical data on prewar economics.

Dallas, Eneas S. *Once A Week, Vol. 4.* London: Bradbury and Evans, 1861

Eneas Dallas' *Once A Week* was a periodical newspaper in London, recapping weekly news and also light literature. For this reason, I suspect the paper appealed not to the upper-class gentlemen but more middle-class readers.

Davis, Jefferson. *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*. New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1958.

This 1955 reprint of Jefferson Davis' work on the Confederate Government reveals information on the Confederate State Department and its activities as well as Confederate privateering efforts in Great Britain. Though it is unmistakably biased and occasionally inaccurate, the book provides an important look to the short-lived Confederate government and how it helped in the quest for Confederate recognition abroad.

Ellison, Mary. *Support for Secession: Lancashire and the Civil War*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1972

In her analysis of Civil War-era Lancashire, Mary Ellison presents a new analysis of the "cotton famine" and how it affected the region and Britain as a whole. In her statistical analysis of Lancashire, the cotton industry and cotton itself she presents a very intriguing analysis.

Foner, Philip S. *British Labor and the American Civil War*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1981

This book presents an informative look at the British lower classes and their support or lack thereof for the war, as well as the various British attempts to circumvent neutrality. It also presents a very good narrative of the Lancashire "cotton famine."

Foreign Office Records, II. America. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

These records contain the combined dispatches of all British Consuls in America (on both sides) during this war. Their private details as well as their opinions and advice on larger issues makes their input on foreign policy quite important.

Freedman & Southern Society Project. "Law Enacting an Additional Article of War." Freedman & Southern Society Project. http://www.history.umd.edu/Freedmen/artwar.htm (Accessed October 9, 2009)

This website, detailing in full the text of the Act Prohibiting the Return of Slaves, represents the first national abolitionist legislation. Abolitionism represented the key to preventing foreign recognition of or intervention on behalf of the Confederacy, and so this source is paramount to a historical project on this topic.

Freedman & Southern Society Project. "The Second Confiscation Act." Freedman & Southern Society Project. http://www.history.umd.edu/Freedmen/conact2.htm (Accessed October 10, 2009)

This website, detailing the Second Confiscation Act of July 1862, laid the groundwork for what would become the Emancipation Proclamation which ended the thought of British recognition of

the Confederacy. As it is the key link between the preliminary abolitionist legislations and the Emancipation Proclamation, its role in this topic cannot be ignored.

Guedalla, Philip. *Palmerston: 1784-1865*. New York: D.P. Putnam's Sons, 1927.

British barrister and popular historian Philip Guedalla presents a detailed look at the life and career of Henry Tuttle, better known as Lord Palmerston. The book delves not only into Tuttle's political life but also his personality, as a popular history should. This description of one of the most popular Prime Ministers in British history presents a look into Abraham Lincoln's counterpart for with this subject.

Guedalla, Philip. *Palmerston and Gladstone: Being the Correspondance of Lord Palmerston with Mr. Gladstone, 1851-1865*. London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1928.

This book lists in their entirety the letters between Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom during the American Civil War, and William Gladstone, who would become Palmerston's second Chancellor of the Exchequer. This private correspondence sheds a light on the two men's working relationship that no other source could, and therefore it presents a unique source of knowledge for research.

Hansard Millbank Systems. "Address to Her Majesty on the Lord's Commissioners' Speech." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1863/feb/05/address-to-her-majesty-on-the-lords> (Accessed March 24, 2010)

This debate in the House of Commons is important as an MP congratulates Lincoln on the Emancipation Proclamation, showing a significant shift from the previously pro-Confederate debates in the Commons in previous years.

Hansard Millbank Systems. "Address to Her Majesty on the Lord's Commissioners' Speech." Hansard Millbank Systems, <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1863/feb/05/address-to-her-majesty-on-the-lords> (Accessed March 24, 2010)

By contrast, a debate in the House of Lords bears no mention of the Proclamation, yet instead chooses to focus on threats to British interests in the Ionian Sea.

Hansard Millbank Systems. "The Adjourned Debate. Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1863/jul/10/the-adjourned-debate-question> (Accessed March 29, 2010)

This brief debate, conducted merely days before news of the Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, highlights Britain's reluctance to recognize the Confederacy even when the Army of Northern Virginia is poised to destroy Washington itself.

Hansard Millbank Systems. "The American States—Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/lords/1861/apr/29/question (accessed October 4, 2009)

This Paliamentary debate represents the first recorded mention of the Civil War in Parliament. The debate has little significance in its own right, yet I needed it. That is all I can say.

Hansard Millbank Systems. "Blockade of the Southern Confederacy—Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1861/may/06/question-2 (Accessed September 30, 2009)

This debate, like the previous debate, represents an important first in Anglo-Confederate relations. As the first mention of the blockade, the question also identifies a prominent Pro-Confederate MP.

Hansard Millbank Systems. "Recognition of the Southern Confederacy." Hansard Millbank Systems. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1863/jun/30/resolution (accessed September 20, 2009)

This final debate, the last push for British recognition, showcases the British reluctance to take action even when it appears a Confederate victory is imminent. It also showcases the fear of the government to support the Confederacy in the face of widespread support of the Emancipation Proclamation.

Hansard Millbank Systems. "Southern Confederate Letters of Marque—Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1861/may/02/southern-confederation-letters-of-marque#S3V0162P0_18610502_HOC_29 (Accessed October 2, 2009)

This debate focuses on the growing question of British privateers to be used against the blockade. It also contains Russell's famous response to the question of the Civil War, which has been used by numerous historians (including this author) to form a basis for his neutral politics.

Hansard Millbank Systems. "Troops in Canada—Question." Hansard Millbank Systems. <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1862/jul/11/troops-in-canada-question> (Accessed October 11, 2009)

This question in the House of Commons illuminates Lord Palmerston's determination to keep British forces in Canada, even after the U.S. tension from the *Trent* affair had passed.

Haroun, Ali Ahmed. *Cotton in the Egyptian Economy*. Louvain-la-Nueve, Belgium: Université Catholique de Louvain, 1979.

This book, with a more Egyptian perspective, takes a longer view of the Egyptian economy and consequently spends little time on the Civil War period, yet its statistics are important nonetheless.

Homens, J. Smith. *An Historical and Statistical Account of the Foreign Commerce of the U.S.* New York: G. P. Putnam and Co., 1857.

This pre-war commercial analysis chronicles the jump in Anglo-American commerce and is essential for understanding the commercial situation at the beginning of the war.

Historical Statistics of the United States. "U.S. Tariff Rates: 1821-1996." Historical Statistics of the United States. <http://pw1.netcom.com/~rdavis2/tariffs.html> (Accessed October 6, 2009)

This chart chronicles the rise and fall of U.S. tariff duties from the 1820s until the introduction of NAFTA. With the introduction of the Morrill Tariff in 1861 it is imperative to examine the rise in tariff duties in a quantitative manner, thereby necessitating this chart.

Jenkins, Brian. *Britain and the War for the Union*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1974

Brian Jenkins' two-volume work on Britain and the Civil War covers every aspect and every incident in impressive detail. His analysis should be required reading for anyone involved in the study of this subject.

Mahin, Dean B. *One War at a Time: The International Dimensions of the American Civil War*. Washington: Brassey's, 1999

Dean Mahin presents a more popular analysis of this subject in *One War at a Time,* yet still manages to instill interest and enthusiasm in his analysis.

Mcpherson, James M. *Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1988

*Battle Cry of Freedom* is, quite unquestionably, the most complete history of the Civil War era published in recent times. Though it does not focus specifically about this subject, Mcpherson delivers succinct and informative research as a basis from which to form accurate historical opinions.

Mcpherson, James M., and James K. Hogue. *Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2009.

James Mcpherson and James Hogue present here what may considered the best introduction to the Civil War era. In their succinct yet detailed and highly approachable analysis, Mcpherson and Hogue present clear arguments on complicated issues related the war, its causes and its aftermath.

Meer, Sarah. *Uncle Tom Mania: Slavery, Minstrelsy & Transatlantic Culture in the 1850s*. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 2005.

Sarah Meer examines the massive international popularity of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* in this book, showcasing its popularity in Britain in particular out of all international markets. Britain's abolitionist sympathies undoubtedly influenced her foreign policy decision-making, and must be examined to present a clear picture of the issue.

Morley, John. *The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, In Two volumes—Vol. 1 (1809-1872)*. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1905.

John Morley's rich portrait of William Gladstone, barely seven years after his death, presents a rich picture of this statesman and proponent of British recognition of the Confederacy. As Chancellor of the Exchequer during the entirety of the Civil War, Gladstone was at the very center of the confederacy's attempted "King Cotton Diplomacy" and would have been instrumental in forming a British response to it. His role in this affair cannot be overlooked.

National Archives and Records Administration. "Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 1862." National Archives and Records Administration. <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals_iv/sections/transcript_preliminary_emancipation.html> (Accessed March 29, 2010)

This online document contains the exact text of the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, released September 22, 1863 and providing the massive shifts in pro-Union sentiments abroad.

Owen, Roger. *Cotton and the Egyptian Economy, 1820-1914*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.

This examination of cotton's revolutionary impact on the Egyptian economy clearly explores the "cotton boom" brought on by the Civil War and accurately chronicles Britain's economic development of the nation as well as Egypt's cotton imports to Britain herself, proving her role in stemming the "cotton famine."

Pound, Reginald. *Albert: A Biography of the Prince Consort.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973.

This biography of Prince Albert greatly details his role in the diffusion of the *Trent* Affair crisis, particularly the response to the British government and the tragic cost to Albert's own health. As the mediator in this dispute, Albert's role in the crisis cannot be overlooked.

Ridley, Jasper. *Lord Palmerston*. New York: E.P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1971

Jasper Ridley's biography of Lord Palmerston is not-so-subtly pro-British, but it is still an excellent source for understanding Palmerston's motives and the rationale behind the heady decisions he made to preserve Britain's neutrality during this time.

Seward, Frederick W. *Seward at Washington, as Senator and Secretary of State. A Memoir of His Life, With Selections From His Letters. 1846-1861*. New York: Derby and Miller, 1891.

William Seward's biography, compiled by his son Frederick, contains literally hundreds of dispatches and diary entries of Secretary of State William Seward. In addition, dispatches from official and unofficial envoys such as Charles Francis Adams are also included, as well as foreign ambassadors such as Lord Lyons. The book is a memoir of Seward's entire life, centering on the war in mostly the second volume. From a diplomatic perspective, this source is indispensible.

Sideman, Belle Becker and Lillian Friedman, eds. *Europe Looks at the Civil War*. New York: The Orion Press, 1960.

Belle Sideman and Lillian Friedman have compiled with this book a collection of European perspectives on the Civil War, ranging from the celebratory to the inflammatory. This collection of primary sources is indispensible for gauging the popular mood in Britain and other European countries affected by the war.

Surdam, David G. "King Cotton: monarch or pretender: The state of the market for raw cotton on the eve of the American civil war." In *Economic History Review*, L1 (1).

David Surdam presents with this article a new interpretation of "King Cotton," proving that the Confederate cotton embargo did not begin to affect Britain until 1862, due to the immensely high prewar cotton exports.

University of Southampton. "Letter from Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston, to Sir G.C.Lewis concerning rifle design, relations with America, and the despatch [*sic*] of troops to Canada, 26 August 1861" <http://www.archives.soton.ac.uk/palmerston/results.php?count=13> (Accessed March 8, 2010)

This letter, written from Palmerston to his Secretary of War just as the American Civil War was heating up, highlights Palmerston's intentions to maintain a strong British presence in the region due to the American lack of cohesion in foreign policy. It is a vital clue into the inner workings of his Cabinet.

University of Southampton. "Letter from Sir G.C.Lewis to Henry John Temple, third Viscount Palmerston, regarding gun trials, the threat of rebellion in Hungary, the American Civil War, and arrangements for sending troops to Canada, 27 August 1861" University of Southampton. <http://www.archives.soton.ac.uk/palmerston/results.php?count=6> (Accessed March 1, 2010)

This letter formally establishes the British government's intention to ship three regiments to Canada, to defend against a possible American attack.

Victoria Regina. "By the QUEEN. A PROCLAMATION." The London Gazette. http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/22510/pages/2046

This article in the May 14th, 1861 London Gazette prints Queen Victoria's Proclamation of Neutrality, in which she forbids British involvement yet gives belligerent status to the Confederates.

Welles, Gideon. *Diary of Gideon Welles, in Three Volumes*. Vol. 1. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911.

This diary not only gives a first-hand account of the naval theater of war, but also a first-hand account of Lincoln's Cabinet. Welles gives the reader important clues into the character of William Seward and how he thinks, as well as the character of many other Washington personalities.

Winks, Robin W. *Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years*. Montreal: Harvest House, 1971.

This history of Canada's ringside seat in the civil war also plays host to Robin Winks' theory on Britain's reluctance to commit to a war against the United States. Dr. Winks presents a look at British colonial policy during the war, examining it in its entirety with a thoroughness which cannot be ignored.

Wise, Stephen R. *Lifeline of the Confederacy: Blockade Running During the Civil War*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988.

Stephen Wise has examined every record of every successful blockade runner leaving Confederate ports through the duration of the war, as well as records of those stopped by blockade ships. His research provides a glimpse into what kinds of ships the blockade runners were, as well as who built them and where they operated. As the success of the blockade runners factored into Britain's decision to remain neutral, I would consider this book paramount to the effective argumentation of this topic.