

When Crisis Compounds Crisis: Inside a Domestic Violence Center During COVID-19

The following investigation examines shelter worker "Emily" and how an Upstate New York domestic violence center works with victims recovering from intimate partner violence—particularly during the pandemic's most isolating months.



Photo by MC2 Sean Hurt

Emily answers the crisis line at 2:47 a.m. The caller's voice is barely audible. She's locked in a bathroom. Her partner is asleep, but she doesn't know for how long. She hasn't left the house in six weeks.

This is March 2020. Upstate New York has just entered lockdown.

Emily—not her real name—has worked at the Victim Resource Center in Upstate New York (VRCNY) for eight years. She knows what economic downturns do to call volume. After the 2008 recession, their hotline lit up. Unemployment triggers financial panic. Financial panic escalates to controlling behavior. Controlling behavior becomes physical violence.

But COVID-19 isn't just another recession. It's a recession plus mandatory isolation plus fear of dying. Every risk factor for domestic violence, activated simultaneously.

The Research Confirms What Workers Already Know

Schneider, Harknett, and McLanahan documented this pattern after the Great Recession. Their 2016 study in *Demography* found that unemployment and economic hardship at the household level correlated with increased abusive behavior. But the research went further: rapid increases in the unemployment rate increased men's controlling behavior toward romantic partners *even after adjusting for individual household unemployment*.

The researchers called it "uncertainty and anticipatory anxiety." Collective economic collapse creates a psychological pressure that transcends individual circumstances. The whole country is afraid. That fear finds its way into homes.

The Paradox: Fewer Clients, Same Crisis

Emily's center serves victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse, stalking, and dating violence. Pre-pandemic, they operated at capacity. Post-lockdown, walk-in appointments dropped 60%.

Management interpreted this as decreased demand. Budget cuts followed.

"They won't look past the numbers," Emily said. "Fewer people coming in doesn't mean fewer people need help. It means they're trapped."

This is the central failure: confusing access with need. The women who called the hotline at 2 a.m. couldn't come to the center because their abusers were home. All day. Every day. Working from home. Supervising remote school. Never leaving.

Lindgren's 2008 research on the leaving process describes why escape requires privacy. Victims need time to plan. They need access to documents, money, phones. They need to make calls when their partner isn't listening. Lockdown eliminated all of these windows.

"The workload has never been manageable. Now we're doing crisis intervention through bathroom doors."

The Mental Health Dimension No One's Tracking

VRCNY offers thirteen service categories:

- Domestic/intimate partner violence case management
- Trauma-informed care
- Sexual assault/rape crisis intervention
- Sexual assault awareness programs
- Child abuse interventions
- Youth-only services
- Bullying interventions
- Stalking interventions
- Suicide prevention

- Justice advocacy
- Short-term counseling

What's missing from this list? Long-term mental health treatment. PTSD management. Anxiety disorder intervention. Depression protocols.

Emily's job is stabilization and referral. Get someone safe. Get them connected to services. Hope those services have capacity.

During COVID-19, those services stopped accepting new clients. Therapists went virtual, but many victims couldn't access telehealth because their abusers monitored their devices. Psychiatric medication management became complicated when nobody could leave the house for blood work.

The gap between crisis intervention and sustained mental health care has always existed. The pandemic made it a chasm.

What Recovery Actually Requires

Trauma from intimate partner violence doesn't resolve with short-term counseling. Huecker and Smock's 2019 review in *StatPearls* documents the neurobiological changes that occur with repeated traumatic exposure: hypervigilance, intrusive memories, emotional dysregulation, altered threat perception.

These symptoms don't disappear when someone moves into a shelter. They require specialized trauma therapy—EMDR, prolonged exposure, cognitive processing therapy. They require psychiatric evaluation for comorbid depression and anxiety. They often require medication management.

Emily can make referrals. She cannot guarantee follow-through. Most community mental health centers have three-month waitlists. Private therapists don't take Medicaid. Victims who fled with nothing have no insurance at all.

The Invisible Workload

Emily described a typical intake: "One person might have family support and just need job training. Another person is living in their car with two kids. One victim is pregnant. One has untreated schizophrenia. One is undocumented and terrified to access any services."

Each case requires different resources: housing assistance, legal advocacy, immigration attorneys, prenatal care, psychiatric crisis intervention, child protective services coordination, employment programs, food assistance, medical care.

Emily maintains relationships with dozens of agencies. She knows which shelters accept families, which legal clinics take emergency cases, which psychiatrists will see uninsured patients, which employers hire people with gaps in their work history.

This network-building is invisible labor. It doesn't appear in productivity metrics. Management sees call volume and walk-in appointments. They don't see the hours spent cultivating relationships that make emergency placements possible.

Secondary Trauma: The Cost Nobody Calculates

Emily is a domestic violence survivor herself. She left her husband years ago. She has three adult children.

Research on secondary traumatic stress shows that workers with personal trauma histories can be more effective—and more vulnerable. They understand the psychological barriers to leaving. They also reactivate their own trauma responses when listening to similar stories eight hours a day.

VRCNY doesn't provide clinical supervision. Emily has no dedicated space to process vicarious trauma. Budget constraints mean no employee assistance program, no on-site counseling, no peer support groups.

Burnout isn't a personal failure. It's a structural inevitability when crisis workers receive no psychological support while absorbing others' trauma.

The Funding Contradiction

VRCNY operates on grants, government contracts, and private donations. The donation page requests kids' shoes, toys, toiletries, blankets—the material needs are endless.

COVID-19 cut both revenue streams. Businesses that typically donated closed. Grant funding shifted to pandemic response. Individual donors, facing their own financial uncertainty, stopped giving.

Meanwhile, operational costs increased. Staff needed PPE. The building required sanitization protocols. Technology upgrades enabled telehealth. New training covered virtual crisis intervention, COVID safety procedures, and trauma-informed pandemic response.

Emily mentioned two specific gaps: bilingual services and addiction treatment. "We need more Spanish-speaking staff. We need substance abuse counselors. People are self-medicating more than ever."

The center can't hire anyone. They're discussing layoffs.

24/7 Access—Until It's Not

VRCNY runs a 24-hour crisis hotline. Emily works nights. When someone calls, she assesses immediate danger, provides safety planning, and arranges emergency shelter if beds are available.

Shelter capacity is the bottleneck. The facility has twelve beds. During the pandemic, they reduced to eight for social distancing. Families with children need two rooms. Someone with a service animal requires ground-floor access. An elderly victim needs accessible facilities.

When no beds are available, Emily's options narrow: coordinate with domestic violence centers in other counties, arrange temporary hotel placement through emergency funds, or help the caller develop a safety plan to survive at home.

None of these alternatives address the immediate threat. A safety plan assumes the person has agency—somewhere to go, someone to call, the physical ability to leave. Lockdown eliminated most of those assumptions.

Prevention vs. Recovery: A False Choice

VRONY has expanded prevention programming: educational outreach to men, legal assistance for migrant farmworkers, community awareness campaigns.

Emily supports these efforts. She also sees the resource tension: "Prevention is critical. But we still have people calling at 3 a.m. because someone's trying to kill them. We can't do both adequately with this staffing."

This is the policy failure—framing prevention and crisis response as competing priorities when both require sustained investment. Preventing future violence doesn't eliminate current emergencies. Centers need capacity for both.

The Adaptation That Never Ends

Emily emphasized that protocols constantly evolve: "Treatment approaches change based on new research. Natural disasters happen. Pandemics happen. You can't assume your training is complete."

COVID-19 created unexpected needs: laptops for children attending virtual school, home health check protocols, enhanced hotline capacity for victims who couldn't access in-person services.

The center adapted, but adaptation costs money. Grant funding doesn't typically cover technology purchases. Private donations go toward immediate needs—food, shelter, clothing.

Nobody budgeted for a pandemic. Now every operational decision involves calculating risk: keep the hotline fully staffed or purchase laptops for clients? Maintain current shelter capacity or upgrade ventilation systems? Preserve jobs or expand services?

What the Data Doesn't Show

Management tracks metrics: number of calls, shelter occupancy rates, counseling sessions completed. These numbers inform funding applications and board reports.

What doesn't get tracked: successful safety plans that prevented escalation, emergency placements arranged at 4 a.m., hours spent building referral networks, emotional labor of crisis de-escalation, psychological toll on staff.

When budget cuts are based solely on service utilization statistics, the invisible work disappears. Emily's ability to connect a pregnant domestic violence survivor with prenatal care, emergency housing, and long-term counseling—none of that registers as a countable intervention.

The result: workers who prevent escalations get penalized for having "fewer clients," while the actual crisis volume remains unchanged.

The Question Nobody's Asking

What happens to the women who called the hotline during lockdown? The ones who couldn't leave because their abuser was always home? The ones who were told to shelter in place—with the person they were sheltering from?

Some called back when they could. Some never did. Emily doesn't know what happened to them.

The research will eventually quantify pandemic-era domestic violence: homicide rates, hospitalization data, child abuse reports. Those studies will document the aggregate harm.

They won't capture the woman who called at 2:47 a.m. The one who was locked in a bathroom, whispering so she wouldn't wake her partner. The one Emily helped create a safety plan—knowing a safety plan might not be enough.

Meanwhile, Emily's wondering what she will do if the center lays her off. The calls keep coming.

References

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